THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy

Vol. XXVIII JANUARY 1951 No. 2

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THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy

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The Modern Schoolman is published in November, January, March, and May. Subscription price, $3.00 a year; foreign subscriptions, $3.20 a year; single copies, $1.00 each. The Modern Schoolman is indexed in the Catholic Periodical Index. Copyright, 1950, by The Modern Schoolman, Saint Louis, Missouri. Permission is required to reprint an article or part of an article.

Address all communications to The Editor or The Business Manager, The Modern Schoolman, Saint Louis University, Saint Louis 3, Missouri. Foreign subscription agencies: England: Duckett, 140 Strand, London, W.C.2; Netherlands: Swets & Zeitlinger, Keizersgracht 471, Amsterdam; Spain: Anaquel Ediciones, Rios Rosas, 11—San Mateo, 21, Madrid.

Entered as second-class matter December 1, 1923, at the post office at Saint Louis, Missouri, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized on January 15, 1929.

PRINTED IN THE U.S.A. BY CUSHING-MALLOY, INC., ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN

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
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FREEDOM AS A PRINCIPLE OF SOCIAL ORDER:

An Essay in the Substance of Subsidiary Function

JOHANNES MESSNER

That freedom should be a principle of social order is an idea that will be surprising to not a few. At first sight most people will be inclined to think that an ordering function in society cannot be attributed primarily to freedom, but only to factors like social authority, positive law, and the executive organs. These factors are often conceived as the substance of social order—and also, from the point of view of individual liberty, as something like a necessary evil without which social life would be impossible. Freedom, on the other hand, is seen as the scope that the socially necessary restrictions leave to the individual for his life and activity as he chooses and decides to manage them. Logically there follows the idea that in this field left to him the individual may pursue his objects and interests without restriction.

In this view of the relation of freedom and order there is, of course, a grain of truth. But if it were wholly correct, man would radically be only an asocial being. He would be a being who chiefly seeks in society protection against his fellow human beings, with the purpose of exercising his freedom as far as this is compatible with the freedom of others. In fact, since Hobbes and Locke this has

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been the basic idea of all attempts at interpreting the nature of society in terms of a social contract. Society was thought to be an institution based on the agreement of all for guaranteeing the freedom of all. In political philosophy the social-contract theory is abandoned today in all its versions. It obviously remains far removed from reality. For the fact is evident that society consists not only in the coexistence of individuals, with their freedom guaranteed, but in the co-operation of all for the purpose of their greatest possible self-fulfillment.

Since the self-fulfillment of all is not possible without the co-operation of all, man is conditioned by nature for such co-operation. His taking part in this co-operation is a demand of his nature and thus a matter of his responsibility. This is the element of truth which is involved in the social-contract theories. In them, however, the tendency which is ordained in human nature towards co-operation has been developed into the idea of a contract. The individualist-liberalist exponents of these theories understood mechanistically what is by its nature the most elementary creative process in the sphere of human existence—man's self-fulfillment by the help of social co-operation. The concept of freedom underlying all social-contract ideas is doubly inadequate. It maintains too much and too little. Too much, because there is no sovereign individual, and no man is aware of having entered into such an agreement as the one postulated. The social-contract theory, with regard to its basis, is therefore a pure fiction. It is a fiction also in its result. Its concept of freedom maintains too little. Man's social existence as characterized by his freedom is evidently not that of mere coexistence, but of co-operation—legal, political, economic, and cultural—for which he is disposed by his nature and through which he is to attain the full stature of his existence. Because of the fallacious concept of freedom, the individualist interpretation of the state's subsidiary function cannot but be inadequate. It restricts the state's authority to the safeguarding of the individual's person and liberty and allows it no function of ordering the social process.

If the individual can attain his full self only in social union, his freedom, according to the collectivist-socialist theories, must be altogether conditioned by the social process. This is held by all of the idealist and materialist interpreters of freedom from Hegel to Marx. They also agree that, as in their concept of the world the real and the necessary are identical, freedom is only possible by way of understanding the necessity in the evolutionary process of social reality. (The difference between the two is, of course, that

reality is ultimately either spirit or matter.) In fact, if man's social existence, as we have urged, consists in his dependence on social co-operation for his self-fulfillment, is not the conclusion then inevitable that the object of social co-operation will be best achieved when a central authority thoroughly plans and organizes this co-operation in all departments and directly supplies everyone with the essentials of life, state authority thus having not only a subsidiary function but being all-providing, all-competent, and all-powerful? This interpretation of the state's function is the conclusion at which—with more or fewer reservations—the collectivist doctrines of all shades from liberal to totalitarian socialism arrive. According to the collectivists the individualist-liberalist theories have been proved wrong in assuming that the best possible self-fulfillment of all would be a necessary by-product of the interaction of the unconditional freedom of all. In the socially possible optimum of such self-fulfillment consists the general welfare. This optimum, the exponents of collectivist-socialist theory say, has evidently not been achieved by individualist-liberalist society, as can be seen from its periodic economic depressions, its chronic mass unemployment—in short, from the pressure of its social problems and the political domination of industrial and financial powers.

Present-day collectivist-socialist experiments do not, however, bear out the thesis that freedom and the general welfare—political, economic, social, cultural—are a necessary by-product of the all-round planning and organizing of human existence. In fact, it is characteristic of liberal socialism today that in theory and practice it is faced with the urgent problem of how the freedom of labor can be preserved in a planned economy. A real answer to this problem has not yet been found in socialist theory, except that of a restriction in the application of collectivist principles themselves to the socio-economic process. And there is the still more pressing problem of how far all collectivist-social experiments are possible at the expense of the socially possible optimum of the general welfare. This is the crucial problem for socialist or totalitarian societies because of its political consequences. Propaganda can blind men's minds for a time, perhaps for a long period, but finally reality will strike them, the reality of what has been achieved for the real general welfare, the reality of the standard of living. Peoples may get used to being deprived of secondary and even essential freedoms in collectivist societies; but they will not be brought to accept a general welfare far below that of other peoples, the less so, indeed, the further they rise in social development and education.

This is the way human nature works if we consider it realistically. Indeed, from this fact arises the most crucial dilemma for all dictators; and it is because of this fact that throughout history all of them, as Treitschke tells us in his study on politics, have had to justify themselves before their peoples by military or national or economic or social achievements. In the long run, for the reason just mentioned, achievement in the economic and social sphere is decisive. It is here that the correlation of freedom and the common good is most directly felt. Even if the ideal of liberty lost its power of appeal, it would force itself upon peoples again because of their desire for economic and social progress as the immediate expression of the realization of the common good.

There are, then, two questions of most vital significance. What are the intrinsic relations between individual freedom and the social good? How far does the general welfare as the outcome of social order depend on the principle of freedom? The principle of freedom in its relation to the social order and the social good has been termed the principle of subsidiary function of social authority, being the factor responsible for the social order and the social good. The implications of the principle of freedom or of subsidiary function can be examined, obviously, only if the nature of the common good is established first.

Of course, only a few basic facts can be pointed to here. To start out from facts—and not from a definition — seems the only promising approach to a problem which has been troubling the world in an increasing degree for over a hundred years because it was handled on the basis of preconceived ideas. The motive forces have been the individualist and the collectivist ideas of the general welfare, the former leading to laissez-faire and the latter to totalitarian planning. The former is based on the idea of man as a self-contained and self-sufficient being; the latter on the idea of man as altogether resultant from, and conditioned by, the social process. Clearly, underlying any idea of the social good is a concept of society and ultimately a concept of man. So we have to ask what the basic facts are in the nature of man with regard to his social existence.

Three facts seem indisputable. First, man is a being who is in need of others for his development. We may here only refer to the fact that all human development towards higher levels of civilization depends on division of labor as a means of co-operation. If each family tried to provide for all its needs by its own resources—that is to say, if each wanted to be its own farmer, baker, weaver,

carpenter, builder, and so on—it would never be able to rise above the most primitive condition. This brings us to the second obvious fact. The outcome of the division of labor as a means of co-operation is much more than the mere sum total of many individual efforts; otherwise there would be no rise in supplies and civilization. The fact in human nature responsible for this is the inequality of the individuals and their complementary dispositions and capabilities. These, in the social process of combination through division of labor, achieve many times more than the mere sum total of their efforts. Yet the individuals, by nature unequal in disposition and capability and thus unequal in their contributions towards the social process, are by nature equal in their human status. This is the third relevant fact. The effect is that the end of their co-operation is attained only so far as all of them pool their efforts and share proportionately in the help that is made available by their co-operation for the fulfillment of the ends equally essential to all of them by reason of their equal human status. These three facts clearly disprove the individualist conception of man, society, and the social good. Man is not self-sufficient; it is not enough that each individual look after himself on the principle of laissez-faire; the social good is not an end to be entrusted to the mechanism of interactive self-interests. Drawing a conclusion from the facts just analyzed, we should have to describe the social good as the help made possible for all by the co-operation of all in their self-fulfillment, according to the ends ordained in human nature.

This brings us to the crucial point of the social good and the correlation of freedom and social order. From our foregoing discussion it can be seen that the social good is related to man's self-fulfillment—that is to say, to his vital ends ordained in the impulses constitutive of his nature. These impulses are not in themselves (as they are in the animal) tendencies fixed and ready in character quantitatively and qualitatively; they have to be developed and integrated into the whole in which the self reaches completion and thus self-fulfillment. In other words, self-fulfillment is for man not merely a feeding problem in the main (as it is for the animal) which can be provided for by an external agency. In contradistinction to the animal, man has a self to develop; and his self-fulfillment depends primarily on his self-determination in directing and developing all his impulses towards the integration of that self. He finds himself guided by the urge towards his "better self"; all other impulses constitutive of human nature fall within the range of this urge. Because of their character, human impulses are intrinsically

different from those of animals, though there may be an external similarity. The sex impulse, the impulse towards happiness, the impulse towards freedom, the social impulse, the cognitive impulse—all of these clearly point to dimensions in the reality of human existence which are missing in that of the animal. Self-fulfillment for man, through the development and fulfillment of his impulses, is a task whose performance depends on his self-direction towards values corresponding to the physical and spiritual impulses which are constitutive of his nature and by the development of which he has to build up his self.

Clearly, such 'self-direction towards self-fulfillment involves man's personal responsibility. Man's self-fulfillment is radically a matter of his free choice of, and of his free decision for, values throughout all phases of his personal existence—economic, intellectual, moral, religious. In consequence the administrator of the great society—that is, state authority—can do no more for the purpose of advancing the social good than make social co-operation as effective as possible in the self-fulfillment of all members of society. Real social good is impaired and reduced so far as social authority presumes to determine the pattern of self-fulfillment of the human personality, either by forcibly imposing patterns of values or by withholding the means for a deviation from official patterns. Clearly, then, if social order is to bring about the optimum social good, freedom is itself a radical ordering principle, and the state's function can only be subsidiary. Being such a principle, freedom is involved on the economic level in the free choice of occupation and the free choice of consumer goods; and it is involved in all other spheres, including the moral and religious, in which man has to seek self-fulfillment.

But there is yet another side to the fact under discussion. Ends which are designed in human nature and establish responsibilities are involved not only in man's individual existence, but also in his social existence. Such social ends—and they are indeed most directly urged upon man by his nature—are those of the family. Further, there are the ends involved in the needs and demands of daily life, which are best satisfied by organized immediate mutual assistance on a basis of the neighborhood, as in the local community. There are, moreover, the common interests of those grouped together because of their occupation within the socio-economic process, with the immediate end of gaining a livelihood as the basis for coping with their tasks in life. And finally there is the all-embracing end of securing law and order and institutions that will

serve everyone for the realization of all these ends, for the realization, in short, of the universal social good. Clearly, all such ends establish responsibilities; the responsibilities establish functions which fall to those charged with the relevant responsibilities; responsibilities in the social sphere establish authorities. Responsibilities and functions may touch upon each other, like those concerned with training the young. But the origin of responsibilities and the ends involved leave no doubt as to primary and secondary responsibilities and functions, and thus also authorities. Hence it is evident that, though the family and the state have functions in the educational field, the authority of the family is primary, that of the state secondary. The state possesses only a subsidiary function. The same holds good for the ends, responsibilities, functions, and authorities of the local and the occupational communities. The principle "one function, one authority," which is the principle of collectivist-socialist society and is directly opposed to that of subsidiary function, is false. There is no such "one" function because the ends and responsibilities underlying the social functions and authorities differ in nature, as can be seen from the instances just mentioned.

The reality underlying human nature thus clearly points to social pluralism. The responsibility, and thus the function, of the great society or the state is directed to a very definite social end designed in human nature. Besides this social end there are others of an equally definite kind—above all, those of the family, the local community, the occupational community. There is further a multitude of other ends which human nature is disposed towards and which can only be attained through social union. These constitute the field of the free associations (like parties, trade unions, co-operatives, and associations for cultural and religious purposes) within the framework of the law and order of the great society. The social good is diversified in kind and pluralistic in structure: there are as many kinds of social good as there are ends in man's social existence, that is, ends which can be fully realized only by the co-operation of individuals within groups. Since each of these ends is the root of responsibility it is the root of a right. Thus there is a plurality of equally original and elementary rights throughout the whole of individual and social human existence. The right of authority in the great society, though it is comprehensive, is only one right among the equally elementary rights of the individuals and communities. Its function is subsidiary in the sense that it is restricted to providing help for the individuals and the lesser communities so that they are enabled to fulfill their essential tasks in

life in self-responsibility and self-determination.

It would seem that only a person whose approach to the reality of human existence is based on preconceived ideas could try to reason away the facts from which our conclusion is drawn; only such a person could dispute the auxiliary and subsidiary character of the universal social good of the great society. If there are, then, original and elementary rights of the individuals and the lesser communities which establish spheres of freedom and trace out the pattern of the social order, then to say that the function of the great society is subsidiary is the same as to establish freedom as a principle of social order, the intrinsic purpose of which is the optimum social good.

We may then sum up what we have found through our analysis. The nature of the universal social good is to be a help, but a help only. It is a help springing from the co-operation of all in their endeavor to fulfill their vital ends as designed by their nature. But it is a help that must not interfere in the self-responsibility and self-determination of the individuals and the lesser communities in the fulfillment of these vital ends.

So far we have only examined one fact about subsidiary function. A second fact, pointing in the same direction, seems to be equally manifest. If we consider the factors on which the achievement of the optimum social good depends, there can be no doubt that they are the minds and hands of everyone within the framework of the social process. Ultimately, no social authority has any other means at its disposal for bringing about the maximum social good than these factors. Everything, then, depends on the fullest possible mobilization of these forces. The efficiency of these forces depends on their willingness and their skill. The readiness of these two, again, depends on the self-interest of the individuals. It is one of the most certain experiences of mankind that no other motive and incentive is as capable of mobilizing all forces in the service of the social good as self-interest. Fresh evidence has been amply provided by nothing so much as by the Soviet-Communist experiment. Tremendous efforts are made to bring other motives and incentives into play since the stimulus of private ownership and free wage-claims has been abolished. The means employed are chiefly three: piece work, bonus systems, the Stakhanov movement with the aim of a "socialist competition." But nothing has been found really capable of replacing self-interest as the motive power towards the optimum result of social co-operation. Human nature speaks too clearly of self-interest. In consequence social authority can, if the

fullest possible reality of the social good is in question, have no other function than that of co-ordinating and stimulating the individuals' activity within the social process. To stifle or to remove its strongest stimulus—self-interest based on private ownership—can not but result in failure to achieve the optimum social good, that is, the optimum standard of living, which economic-technical evolution would make possible.

In the fact under discussion there is yet another aspect that is of great significance. Self-interest as a motive power in the social process is by no means only an expression of a mere acquisitive impulse; its roots go down to a much more radical impulse of human nature. This is the creative impulse. It is precisely in the economic sphere that this impulse first becomes effective in the development of human culture. The grazing animal never tries to improve the fertility of the ground; it moves on when it can find no more easy food. Man has applied his creative impulse to the land in order to better his standard of living; hence all development of human culture has sprung from agriculture. Man's creative impulse drives him to plan and build his future in the economic field. To investigate here how far the satisfaction of man's creative impulse is indispensable for the fulfillment of his impulse towards happiness would go too far. But there can be no doubt that it is through depriving the creative impulse of the vast majority of its possibilities of being active that the collective organization of the socio-economic process does most harm to the social good of its society. In virtue of his creative impulse and its relation to his essential happiness, man wants to plan and build himself; and enormous forces in the service of the social good are mobilized if he is given scope to do so. If he is made a tool only, shaped and adjusted by a few planners above him, the outcome of such centralized organization must be that the development of the social good will be far below what could be achieved. The conclusion, then, is clear: the great society and its authority can have only a subsidiary function if the social good is to reach its optimum fulfillment; or, what is the same, freedom is a principle of social order if this order is to attain its object, the optimum general welfare.

There is yet a third fact which characterizes human reality and which places the social good and social authority in an auxiliary position. It takes us back to the problem of the self-fulfillment of all. Man's self-fulfillment, we have seen, is the intrinsic purpose of the social good, but is dependent on man's self-determination in the personal side of his existence. We have now to turn to the social

side and its significance for man's self-fulfillment. This demands special consideration because it seems to be a very widespread idea that man's self-fulfillment is something exclusively concerned with the personal sphere in human existence, something that is altogether outside the social sphere. This could be true only if man were not essentially a social being. As soon as it is admitted that man is radically a social being, it would seem to be beyond dispute that the social side of his existence is no less involved in his self-fulfillment than the personal. Man is not like the individual in a highly complex animal society such as that of bees or ants, a being predisposed, predetermined, and ready-made by nature to fit into the whole of the social process without its self-development being involved. Since man, as we have seen, has a self to develop and since this development depends on social co-operation, the functioning of social co-operation is fundamentally each one's own concern in his self-fulfillment. Man's self-fulfillment is radically foiled if his social impulse is restricted to an ignoble, passive, subservient role and is deprived of any active and constructive part in shaping the life of the community, political as well as industrial. But precisely this is the fate of the majority of men in modern mass society. The only influence wielded by the majority of individuals in mass society is their vote at the polls once in two or more years. Then they are sunk to the status of anonymous factors in the huge economic-technical-bureaucratic production apparatus of industry; they become equally impersonal entities in the political-administrative-bureaucratic machinery of the modern state. Since man's development to his full stature depends on social co-operation, he must feel essentially frustrated when he has no part in organizing the process of social co-operation and controlling its functioning in the service of its ultimate purpose. The radical frustration of man's social impulse resulting from this development would alone account for the unrest in modern society, national and international, during the last hundred years.

There can be no real doubt of the remedy. Society must be organized around man, his ends, and the vital tasks of his self-fulfillment—not man reduced to the anonymity of a factor in economic calculations and administrative files. So organizing society around man means building up society out of communities in which individuals are locally and occupationally grouped according to immediate social co-operation, communities whose members share immediately in the shaping and controlling of their functioning. Such an organization of the social process in the great society can

alone give the individual the chance to develop his social impulse fully, affording him his full say in a self-governing community and thus giving him his share of responsibility for the development of society, for the fulfillment of its vital functions and destiny, and thus for the fulfillment of his own destiny as a social being. The self-government of lesser communities, which are the building blocks of the great society, is, then, essential to the reality of the social good, if self-fulfillment of all by the co-operation of all is the purpose of the social good. Hence only a subsidiary function is left to the authority of the great society. We cannot here go into further detail about the consequences of such a change in the structure of society, that is, the transformation of mass society into a community of communities. Only one may be mentioned. In such a change, the individuals would look upon the social good as their immediate concern in all its aspects, in that of productivity no less than of distribution. At present, on the other hand, the social good is chiefly considered as something far remote from the individual and chiefly of interest because of a possibility of his profiting from it.

It may have struck the reader that in the whole course of our analysis of the reality of human nature we have found the principle of the common good and the principle of subsidiary function in the closest conjunction. In fact, they are radically one; they are only different aspects of the rationale of social order. Why is it, then, that the principle of subsidiary function has come so much to the foreground of sociological discussion and that references to it have become increasingly frequent only since the thirties? The reason is that, up to the turn of the century, the individualistic principles were dominant in social theory and social reality; the principle of the common good had therefore to be stressed and urged forward. The collectivist movement in social theory and social reality since then gained rapidly in momentum, until the rise of the totalitarian state in its various forms; so the principle of subsidiary function with its implications for the political, economic, social, and cultural fields acquired critical significance.

No one should be induced to believe, however, that the principle of subsidiary function—though the term was not used—had not been discussed long before in analyzing the fundamentals of the social order and special problems involved in its actual development in individual societies. As often as the limitations of the powers and rights of social authority or the fundamental claims and rights of the human person were discussed it was in substance always the principle of subsidiary function that was in question. In fact,

since the days of Plato and Aristotle this has been one of the themes that have dominated Western thought throughout its development. The centre of gravity in valuation shifted slowly but steadily from the political community, to which a status of primacy was attributed in ancient thought, to the human person, whose supersocial value and, in consequence, whose status as the ultimate end of all social functions became securely established in social theory after the time of St. Augustine and under the influence of the Christian concept of man. In a famous passage in his book on free will St. Augustine stated the principle of subsidiary function with all precision, saying it is the natural thing that the people should be empowered by law to select the magistrates "who are to administer its affairs—for that is what the state is." It is well known how definite and sensitive toward political liberties not only political theory was throughout the Middle Ages, but also society and public opinion at large.[1]

In modern times one of the most outstanding inquiries into the state's subsidiary function is the famous study, a classic on the subject, by Wilhelm von Humboldt.[2] His homeland was one where enlightened despotism had been ruling for a century and where despotic tutelage over the citizens, restraining and controlling all spheres of life, was the long-established form of government. There is perhaps no better criticism of bureaucracy and its detrimental effects upon man's finer qualities and the social good to be found than in Humboldt's study. In the middle of the nineteenth century John Stuart Mill's chief concern, in his Principles of Political Economy and On Liberty, was the bearing of the principle of subsidiary function upon social economy and political government. Since the turn of the present century and the rise of modern socialism, the significance of the principle of subsidiary function has been increasingly impressed upon the mind. It was Nietzsche who found perhaps the shortest and most concise formula for the contrast between social philosophy based on socialist theory and one based on the principle of subsidiary function. The former, he says, holds the principle of "as much state as possible"; the latter maintains

[1] In evidence of this, one need only mention the admirable study by A. J. Carlyle, Political Liberty, A History of the Conception in the Middle Ages and in Modern Times (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1941) and that by the brothers R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West (6 vols.; Edinburgh: Blackwood & Sons, 1928-36).

[2] Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen (Breslau, 1851).

the principle of "as little state as possible." Subsequently the principle of subsidiary function has often been expressed in formulations like this: "As much state as necessary, as much freedom as possible." Long before the totalitarian state had become an immediate threat to Western society (and since then in a rapidly rising degree) periodicals and books of all shades of political and philosophical outlook have been filled with discussions of such subjects as liberty and authority, the individual and the community, the citizen and the state, and the human person and mass society, all of which are in one way or another concerned with the inquiry into, and the application of, the principle of subsidiary function.

To call to mind the position of the principle of subsidiary function in the development of Western thought, as we have just tried to do by referring to such diverse thinkers, seems important for the reason that very clearly this principle is by no means deduced from a priori philosophical or religious principles, but is altogether grounded in the make-up of the reality of human nature itself. To bring out this point, we have been anxious, in the course of our analysis of human nature in its individual and social aspects, to develop the principle of subsidiary function by a purely empirical-rational approach.

If the principle of subsidiary function is the cardinal principle of social liberty and free society, it is evident that the interpretation of freedom itself gains crucial significance in its implications. Hence a word or two is required in conclusion about one of the most tragic paradoxes in human history. It was the individualism of the nineteenth century, with its concept of freedom as absolute and dissevered from any intrinsic purpose, which paved the way for the collectivism of the twentieth century. From our analysis of the social good and its optimum realization in the service of human self-fulfillment it may be seen that human freedom is intrinsically related to the ends designed in human nature and thus to the essential tasks in life that fall under the responsibility of the human person. It is these ends and tasks that give freedom claims and rights to cope with them in self-determination and self-responsibility. In consequence, social co-operation and social authority are left only with the function of being a help to the individual in the fulfillment of these tasks, and hence only with a subsidiary function. The crucial point is, then, whether man and society are prepared to see these tasks in proper perspective. This is evidently a matter of the interpretation of human existence. It is from the fallacious concept of man that the fallacious individualist concept of liberty has sprung.

This concept has no positive meaning because the underlying interpretation of human nature would not admit ends and tasks designed within it. It is for this reason that individualism has been unable to find a constructive social program; more, it has produced that vast social and mental vacuum in which the collectivist beliefs and endeavors can thrive.

Today the conviction is growing that only by a return to a truer concept of freedom will the Western world be able to secure the spiritual dynamic necessary for giving mankind, in the present clash of ideologies, a lead towards a new and reassuring future. The issue is charged with enormous difficulties by reason of the spiritual climate produced by "individualistic humanism"; it is further charged with difficulties springing from present day "scientific humanism" which, in the Western societies, has grown in that climate. Scientific humanism in the main proposes an interpretation of human nature in which there is no room for free will. The idea of social freedom is deprived of its foundation and meaning, however, if free will is not a reality and man is radically subject to determinism, the view held today in Western thought by such influential interpretations of human existence as analytical psychology, biological evolutionism, dialectical materialism, logical positivism, and ethical utilitarianism. Indeed, if the Western world stands for "free society," it will have to be scarcely less concerned for a long time about its own ideological foundations than about the tactics of the opposing ideological front. To hold its own, many voices insist today, the free world must give the concept of freedom the positive meaning pointed to by the ends, tasks, and responsibilities which man finds unmistakably ordained in his nature. For then it will be able to develop a concept and a reality of a social order which, at last giving human nature its due after a hundred years of misinterpretation, could be trusted to as having the spiritual resources needed for overcoming the dynamism of the individualist-collectivist dilemma and for securing ordered freedom against the centralizing modern developments in the technical, economic, political, and social field. Then the free world will be guided by a clear concept of subsidiary function as the cardinal principle of social order.

GILSON'S BEING AND SOME PHILOSOPHERS

Louis-Marie Régis, O.P.

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Assiduous readers of Etienne Gilson's writings will be happy to learn that he has added to his numerous works a volume[1] which, in my opinion, should constitute a turning point in the philosophical speculation of our time. In the Preface of this book, which offers an admirable complement to the theme already introduced in The Unity of Philosophical Experience, M. Gilson has endeavoured to determine himself the particular character of the work which he is presenting to his public:

> . . . this is not a book in the history of philosophy; it is a philosophical book, and a dogmatically philosophical one at that (p. ix) . . . . The only task of history is to understand and to make understood, whereas philosophy must choose; and applying to history for reasons to make a choice is no longer history, it is philosophy (p. x).

To forget these remarks of the author in the course of reading his latest work would be an injustice to him; and one would also incur the risk of misunderstanding the authentic philosophical reflection

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[1]Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pont. Inst. of Med. Studies, 1949).

of a great master of contemporary metaphysical thought.

Being and Some Philosophers is a work entirely devoted to metaphysics; it is strictly a philosophical reflection on the subjectum of first philosophy, on being as being. It takes its start from the successive systematizations which thinkers have elaborated in the course of the two millenniums which have preceded our times. Here are the very significant titles of the six chapters which this book contains:

I. On Being and the One (pp. 1-40)
II. Being and Substance (pp. 41-73)
III. Essence and Existence (pp. 74-107)
IV. Existence versus Being (pp. 108-53)
V. Being and Existence (pp. 154-89)
VI. Knowledge and Existence (pp. 190-216)

I. THEME OF BEING AND SOME PHILOSOPHERS

It is not easy to summarize, in a few words, the main themes of a thought whose profoundness of doctrine is on a par with its historical documentation.

Let me attempt this summary by a description of the general impression I have retained after attentive readings of M. Gilson's book. Imagine all the philosophers of the last two millenniums as forming three distinct families and as grouped by order of ascent and descent according to the conception they have of being as being and of the relations of being to God. Each of these families will have its own genealogy with its direct line and, according to its fecundity, its more or less numerous collateral lines. Thus grouped under the standard of being as being and of its relations with the supreme cause, the philosophers constitute three distinct genealogies; the Platonic, the Aristotelian, and the Thomistic family tree.

The analytical critique of these three families of metaphysicians, not in their superficial resemblances, but in their deepest affinities—such is the material treated in Being and Some Philosophers. Let us trace, following the author's footsteps, the main characteristics of these families of thinkers.

A. THE PLATONIC TREE
(Chaps. I, III, and part of IV)

Descended from Parmenides, from his conception of being as one-immutable-abstract, this tree owes its substance and growth to Plato—to his admirable dialectical investigations of the one, the other, being, the good, as well as to the key he offers to explain the world, the notion of participation. This tree takes root in a being as being which is defined as identity, whether this identity be formulated in terms of essence, form, or idea; it excludes matter, becoming, actual existence, as elements that have no place in its definition; moreover, it is incapable of leading the human intelligence to God, because God is outside of it.

Plato's descendants, in direct line, are Plotinus, Proclus, the Neoplatonic Christians such as Marius Victorinus (p. 31), Pseudo-Dionysius (p. 34), Scotus Eriugena, in the ninth century (p. 34), and Meister Eckhart (p. 38) in the fourteenth.

The descendants in the collateral lines, which branch forth from the main Platonic stem, are very numerous. One finds them in the Arab world and among Christian thinkers and modern philosophers. As is the case for every collateral line of a genealogical tree, the blood of these descendants is not pure. It is mixed with foreign blood; and in the present case the mixture results from Aristotelian factors, such as the distinction of matter and form, substance and accidents, and the notion of nature. But the identity of being with itself is still the distinctive mark of the metaphysics of those thinkers for whom being is first and foremost essence. Avicenna is truly the starting point of these collateral lines on the Platonic tree, with his threefold distinction of essence: (a) as essence taken in itself; (b) as engaged in the individual; and (c) as known by the intellect (p. 75). Considered in itself, essence is an absolute whose abstract necessity is indifferent to existence whether individual or intelligible. This ghost of the Platonic idea becomes the center of Avicennian metaphysics and, transferred to God, is defined as the supremely necessary principle, cause of every creature; each actual existence becomes a particular moment of this first necessity (p. 81).

This necessity, which is the law of the First Cause and of everything that issues forth from him, could not be accepted as such by Catholic theologians, for whom God is supreme liberty and for whom the creation of the universe is a gratuitous gift of divine liberty. Thus Avicennianism had to undergo certain trans-

formations before being capable of serving the faith. This was the work of the Franciscan School, mostly that of Duns Scotus and his disciples (pp. 83-96), who replaced causal necessity in the Supreme Being by the absolute liberty of the divine will, even with respect to created essences and their structures. The Avicennian essence becomes natura for Duns Scotus, but retains its characteristic mark as an absolute, as essence taken in itself; and actual existence becomes something accidental, something added to being.

As a third branch of the Platonic tree, we come upon Suarez, who does not accept the Scotist exclusion of existence from the notion of being, but remains nevertheless in the Platonic line by defining being not as that which exists but as the intrinsic possibility of existence (pp. 96-98). Being, thus defined as the intrinsic possibility of existence, is expressed in a single concept. This, however, can be interpreted in two ways. It can signify a real essence by abstraction from actual existence (and this is the meaning of "being" as a noun or substantive); it can also signify, as a verb, reality in its actual existence, by a contraction or limitation of its original meaning of intrinsic possibility of existence. In a metaphysics where being as being is a universal which neither includes nor excludes actual existence, the problem of the real distinction of essence and existence necessarily becomes a pseudo-problem; since where being is identified with essence (and the Suarezian being implies this identification still more than the being of Avicenna and of Duns Scotus [p. 102]), to be oneself or to be essence and to exist are one and the same (p. 103).

The Suarezian notion of being appears as the Scholastic notion par excellence for all modern philosophers. It was preserved by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Wolff, the man who, after J. Clauberg and Leibnitz, invented ontology or the science of being as being, which is an entity common to God and creatures (pp. 108-19). The last step in the total exclusion of existence as an essential element of being was taken by Hegel, for whom ontology became pure logic, since being is identified with our idea of being (pp. 119-41).

As a last branch of the Platonic tree—and this, a branch of contradiction, for it claims to defend existence against essence—we come across existentialism, principally that of Kierkegaard. He fights against all speculative knowledge of being, against all ontology, because ontology is but a dream and an evasion with which man has no concern, for it tells him nothing about himself or about God, on whom he is totally dependent (pp. 142-53).

B. THE ARISTOTELIAN TREE
(Chapter II)

The Platonic line of metaphysicians considers being as the one, the immutable, form, essence. With Aristotle and his disciples, being abandons its abstract and immobile character to become concrete and dynamic; it is first of all nature, substance, and act (pp. 43-45). But what is the nature of this act? Is it existence or substantial character of being? M. Gilson, starting from the Stagyrite's texts, shows that Aristotle saw that the actuality of a thing evidently means its existence. But when Aristotle wishes to define being, he always does it in terms of substance and above all of substantial form (pp. 45-47), because substantial form is the element which gives beings their quiddity. Hence our author concludes that Aristotelianism is to all appearances a kind of reversed Platonism—that is, a terrestrial Platonism instead of a celestial one (p. 47)—and that the arguments so skillfully constructed by Aristotle against Plato's ideas could serve to refute Aristotle himself (pp. 48-50). And Aristotle's supreme being does not escape this substantial character:

> The Aristotelian God is a being of which we can say what He is, namely, the pure act of an eternally self-thinking Thought. There is no trace of any invitation to rise above substance in such a metaphysics, no inducement therefore to wonder if, after all, whatness is truly the whole of reality (p. 67).

The Aristotelian tree, for all practical purposes, does not have any collateral branches, unless one grafts into it certain Neoplatonic schools which were strongly influenced by his doctrine on causality. The direct lineage is not very numerous. Two thinkers particularly find places there: Averroes, who represents the Arabian philosophical world, and Siger of Brabant, who represents the Christian. These two thinkers have retained their master's system in its integrity. But they found themselves confronted with particular difficulties arising from the Biblical revelation of a God who freely created a temporal universe and who presents himself to his adorers as the Existing (pp. 51-52). Averroes solved the problem by lowering theological knowledge and making it into a belief based on dialectical arguments (p. 58). A Catholic theologian, however, could not resort to the same artifice, since faith is the most certain of all knowledge and surpasses metaphysics in truth and certitude.

This insoluble problem was the one faced by Siger of Brabant; and the doctrine of the double truth, which rightly or wrongly is attributed to him, was the consequence of the confrontation of his faith and his Aristotelianism (pp. 61-73).

C. THE THOMISTIC TREE
(Chaps. V-VI)

It is customary to relate Thomism to Aristotelianism and make St. Thomas Aquinas a disciple of Aristotle. M. Gilson shows us that in metaphysics and epistemology Aquinas is no one's son and that with him begins the construction of a wisdom whose originality and power are such that he is truly its creator. All the novelty of this new metaphysics lies in the definition of being as being and of its connections with God, total and only cause of everything which is not himself (pp. 154-58). And just as St. Thomas does not have any forebears, so he has no true descendants, and his genealogical tree is very poorly developed:

> . . . it would be vain for us to go farther back into the past than the time of Thomas Aquinas, because nobody that we know of has cared to posit existence in being, as a constituent element of being. And it would be no less vain to look in the more immediate past for a more modern expression of the same truth, because, paradoxically enough, what was perhaps deepest in the philosophical message of Thomas Aquinas seems to have remained practically forgotten since the very time of his death (p. 154).

"To be" is (formally) defined by St. Thomas as "to exist." It is this act of acts which characterizes being as being, and not unity, immobility, form, essence, or possibility. And as God alone is pure existence, every creature—that is, every being precisely in so far as it is being—is immediately and radically bound to the one source of every existence, which is God, the efficient, final, and exemplary cause of everything created (pp. 156-59). Thus Thomistic metaphysics is at the same time a metaphysics and a natural theology, that is, a wisdom. In the course of these pages, which are the most beautiful pages the author has written on the universe and God, he shows us the infinite distance which separates Thomistic being from Aristotelian being, along with the diversity of the universes which these two philosophies explain. The analyses of

the contingency and the necessity of creatures in the Thomistic universe are extremely penetrating; so also are the pages devoted to the exposition of the time-honored problem of the real distinction of essence and existence (pp. 160-72). The consequences which result from this structure of being as being and from its connections with God are presented by the author in pages remarkable for their clearness and penetration (pp. 173-87). One must read and meditate on them to extract from them what constitutes the very soul of Thomistic wisdom, a soul which unfortunately remains unrecognized and whose recovery may perhaps bring about a totally new orientation of contemporary philosophy.

"Just as aetiology hangs on ontology, so also does epistemology" (p. 187). These words, which conclude the exposition of the foundations of Thomistic metaphysics, introduce the problem of the knowledge of that being-as-being whose most constitutive element is the act of existing. Because of the pre-eminence of existence, M. Gilson affirms that being can only be truly known by the act of judgment in Thomism, and that the simple apprehension can at most grasp the essence, the representable (pp. 187-90). Since being as being is not a form, but an act, the knowledge which grasps it will not be a concept but a judgment; such is the thesis held by our author in the concluding pages of his book (pp. 202-10) The thesis is skillfully defended, and we shall see, in the following remarks, what one as a Thomist must think of such a stand.

The conclusion drawn by M. Gilson from his reflections on being and its adventures throughout the ages of humanity deserves to be quoted:

> The confusion or the divorce of essence and existence are two errors equally fatal to philosophy. A true metaphysics of being alone can reconcile history with objective knowledge, existence with essence and time with eternity . . . . No less fond of concepts than that of Hegel, no less related to the philosopher and to man than that of Kierkegaard, such a metaphysics is neither a system nor the self-expression of a solitary existence. It is, before anything else, wisdom, and it aims to insure the progressive adequation of human knowledge to actually existing being (p. 215).

II. CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS ON SOME OF M. GILSON'S AFFIRMATIONS

This book of Gilson's, the richness and vitality of which cannot be expressed in the pale outline we have just given, certainly constitutes the most vigorous reconstruction of the genesis and truth of metaphysical knowledge. I should like, however, to make certain criticisms, which, though not bearing on the foundations of the doctrine, have to do nonetheless with certain aspects whose importance calls for special attention.

A. ARISTOTELIAN BEING

That Aristotelian being is above all substance and nature, that Aristotle's philosophy is more physical than metaphysical, that the nature of existence and its origins are not explained by the Stagyrite, such are incontrovertible truths about Aristotelianism. But the conclusion which the author derives from this doctrine and the reason which justifies this conclusion do not appear convincing to me:

> Thus, the world of Aristotle is made up of existents without existence . . . . He himself is a Janus Bifrons. There is a first Aristotle, who wrote the Historia Animalium . . . . But there is a second Aristotle, much nearer to Plato than the first one, and what this second Aristotle says is: "The individuals comprised within a species, such as Socrates and Coriscos, are the real beings; but inasmuch as these individuals possess one common specific form, it will suffice to state the universal attributes of the species, that is, the attributes common to all its individuals, once for all." This "once for all," is indeed dreadful. It is responsible for the immediate death of those positive sciences of observation which Aristotle himself had so happily fostered (p. 50).

I do not see the "dreadful" character of this affirmation of Aristotle's, nor how it is responsible for the death of the positive sciences. To grasp the properties common to the individuals of a species, one must first study the individuals in their diversity, since the common aspects appear only after an investigation of the multitude of individuals and hence only after the positive study of

reality in its individual existence has been made. And the history of animals is for the Stagyrite only the scientific prelude to a philosophical knowledge of animal life. Every philosophical science must today, as in Aristotle's time, leave out the accidental and the contingent to consider only the necessary. The causal bond which characterizes demonstrative science can only be realized in Thomism, as in Aristotelianism, by an abstraction from particulars in favor of the specific notes. When M. Gilson tells us that the difference between history and philosophy is that history describes in order to make things understood while philosophy chooses in order to possess the truth (p. x), and when he applies this definition to the study of metaphysics, he does exactly what Aristotle did when, after his positive investigation of animals, he constructed a science therefrom: he chooses the common notes of the different families of metaphysicians; he sets aside the accidental differences; and the marvelous synthesis which results from this method proves well enough how true the Aristotelian method is. For twenty-five years M. Gilson has been a historian of metaphysical doctrines; for twenty-five years he has constructed the history of systems and described them with the scrupulous honesty and the profound intelligence which characterize him. Today he takes a position—he is a metaphysician in the strongest sense of the word. Does it follow that he has renounced his knowledge of history? No; he has used it—and he has used it precisely to eliminate the accidental in metaphysical positions, to classify the philosophers in three great families, and to award the palm to Thomas Aquinas because he was the only one really to grasp the profound meaning of being and of the universe. This does not make M. Gilson a Janus Bifrons, since he possesses at the same time the knowledge of the individual systems of metaphysics and the metaphysical wisdom whose truth is independent of these systems.

Those are the reasons which make it impossible for me to admit that Aristotelianism is nothing but a Platonism come down from the skies and that the dialogue entitled the Aristoteles which Gilson puts on Plato's lips is convincing. All of this dialogue or refutation rests indeed on the notion of Platonic participation. But we know well enough what Aristotle thought of this notion of participation,[2] and it would not have been by the machinery of exemplar causality that he would have explained the unity of the species, but by means of efficient and final causality, as he did in the second book of the Physics.

[2]Aristotle Metaphysics i. 6. 987b 8-14.

There is also, in my opinion, an oversimplification of Aristotelianism in the following statement:

> The primary mistake of Aristotle, as well as of his followers, was to use the verb "to be" in a single meaning, whereas it actually has two. If it means that a thing is, then individuals alone are and forms are not; if it means what a thing is, then forms alone are, and individuals are not. The controversy on the being of universals has no other origin than the failure of Aristotle himself to make this fundamental distinction (p. 49).

It is well to note, first, that the controversy about the universals took place among Neoplatonic philosophers, that it had its origin in a text of Porphyry, and that, in such a philosophy, it was impossible to find an Aristotelian solution to a Neoplatonic problem. The counterproof is easily established: as soon as a philosopher possessing the Aristotelian doctrine on being and knowledge starts to examine this difficulty, it dissolves immediately, as is evident in the Angelic Doctor.[3]

As for the single meaning of the verb "to be" and the dilemma arising therefrom according to M. Gilson (p. 49), here is the answer which Aristotle could give: "I admit that being designates first of all the substance; but the latter has many meanings in my philosophy,[4] and among these meanings the most important are: (a) the concrete singular, such as Socrates, Coriscos; (b) the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι or the abstract quiddity. But these two meanings are bound together, since the abstract quiddity is neither a separated form in the manner of Plato nor a universal nor a being of reason, but the ontological principle of that same individual reality called Socrates or Coriscos,[5] in which it takes its origin and to which it is completely ordered as to an end. Hence the individuals exist; they are; and in them and by them, as their intrinsic cause, the quiddities exist. Your dilemma would be valid in Platonism, but it has no value in Aristotelianism." Such could be Aristotle's defense against M. Gilson's accusation.

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[3]Cf. among other texts In I Periherm., ed. Leonine, lect. 10, nos. 9-12.

[4]Aristotle op. cit. v. 8. 1017b 10-27.

[5]Ibid. vi. 3. 1028b 34-1029a2.

B. THE KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

The problem of the knowledge of existence is the alpha and omega of our author's book. It is with this problem that he begins his inquiry into being as being and it is with its solution that his inquiry terminates. From the very first pages, we have a very clear indication of the road which M. Gilson is taking as a result of his categorical refusal of the concept as a means of knowing existence. Here is the text:

> It is not enough to say that being is conceivable apart from existence; in a certain sense it must be said that being is always conceived by us apart from existence, for the very simple reason that existence itself cannot possibly be conceived. The nature of this paradoxical fact has been admirably described by Kant . . . "Being," Kant says, "is evidently not a real predicate, or a concept of something that can be added to the concept of a thing" (p. 3).[6]

The entire chapter on the knowledge of existence is but an elaborate commentary on the affirmations we have just recalled. First of all, there is the distinction between the conceptus, which is the term of apprehension, and the judicium, which is the term of the second operation of the mind which composes or divides two concepts (p. 190). Then we have the study of propositions, and of their division into one-term and two-term propositions, a study which manifests the nonpredicability of the verb "to be," since it is not a concept and every predicate is a concept (pp. 190-202). Finally we have the inevitable conclusion that, since the knowledge of existence cannot be had through a concept, it must result from the judgment, which meets all the conditions of concreteness and actuality necessary for a grasp of this concrete act par excellence which is the "to exist" (pp. 202-13).

1. THE INCONCEIVABILITY OF "TO BE"

> As to the "copula," it is not really a term, because it designates, not a concept, but the determinate relation which obtains between two

[6]Cf. pp. 124-26.

> terms. For this reason the copula cannot be a noun; it is a verb. In point of fact, it is the verb is (p. 190).

No one will contest that the verb is not a noun, for its function in the enunciation is radically opposed to that of the noun;[7] but it is quite a different matter to affirm that the verb is not a concept because it is not a noun, and I fear very much that it would be impossible to justify such an affirmation in Thomism, even by using the epistemological vocabulary used by M. Gilson. If indeed the term of every act of apprehension deserves the name of concept in the strict sense of the word (p. 190), it seems impossible to me that the name of concept be denied to the verb, since it is undoubtedly the fruit of the first operation of the mind. Here are a few texts:

> . . . the meaning of a sentence differs from the meaning of a noun or verb, because a noun or a verb means a simple understanding, but a sentence means a composite understanding.[8]
> It is to be said that, since the operation of the intellect is twofold, as was said above, he who expresses a noun or a verb by itself, establishes an understanding as far as the first operation is concerned, which is the simple conception of something.[9]

There are other interesting texts on this same point.[10]

But the verb "to be" is the verb par excellence; used alone in the present tense, which is the verb simpliciter,[11] it is not capable of expressing truth or of constituting the enunciation and hence does not belong to the second operation of the mind.[12]

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[7] In I Periherm., lect. 5.

[8] ". . . significatio orationis differt a significatione nominis et verbi: quia nomen vel verbum significet simplicem intellectum; oratio vero significat intellectum compositum," (ibid., lect. 6, no. 2).

[9] "Sed dicendum est quod cum duplex sit intellectus operatio, ut supra habitum est, ille qui dicit nomen vel verbum secundem se, constituit intellectum quantum ad primam operationem, quae est simplex conceptio alicujus" (ibid., lect. 5, no. 17).

[10] Ibid., lect. 1, no. 5; lect. 3, no. 11; lect. 8, no. 17; In II Periherm., lect. 1, no. 1.

[11] In I Periherm., lect. 5, no. 22.

[12] Ibid., nos. 17, 18, 19-22.

2. THE IMPREDICABILITY OF "TO BE"

> If the proposition, "Peter is," means anything, it means that a certain man, Peter by name, actually is, or exists. Is does not predicate anything, not even existence; it posits it . . ." (p. 201).

Why this unwillingness to make a predicate of the verb "to be?" Because it is not a concept and every predicate must be a concept. But we have just seen that the verb is a concept and that the verb "to be" is the first analogate of all verbs, since it always expresses an act, an actual act, and that existence is the actuality par excellence. Hence under this aspect, there is no reason to take from the verb "to be" its function as a predicate, and the following affirmation does not seem to be justified in any way in Thomism: "In short, existence is a prerequisite for the truth of any predication, but it does not directly fall under the scope of predication" (p. 196). And the conclusion derived therefrom is not any more justified: "We thus find ourselves confronted with the fact that, since is does not mean either a predicate or a subject, its meaning must needs be wholly contained in itself" (p. 196).

The truth, in Thomism, is that the verb is the predicate par excellence: ". . . since predication seems to pertain more properly to the composition, it is the verbs that are predicated, rather than means predicates."[13] Now, in existential propositions, the verb "to be" is predicated per se: ". . . this verb is is sometimes predicated by itself in an enunciation, as when it is said, 'Socrates is.' By this we do not intend to mean anything other than that Socrates is in reality."[14] Furthermore, the propositions de tertio adjacente are not so called "because, in them, the predicate is the third word" (p. 191), but because the verb is is added to the principal predicate and does not have its function as per se predicate.

> Sometimes [is] is not predicated per se, as principal predicate, but as conjoined to the principal predicate to connect the latter with the subject. For example, when we say "Socrates is

[13] ". . . cum praedicatio videatur magis proprie ad compositionem pertinere, ipsa verba sunt quae praedicantur, magis quam significent praedicata" (ibid., lect. 5, no. 9).

[14] ". . . hoc verbum est quandoque in Enunciatione praedicatur secundum se; ut cum dicitur, Socrates est: per quod nihil aliud intendimus significare quam quod Socrates sit in rerum natura" (In II Periherm., lect. 2, no. 2).

> white," the meaning is not to assert that Socrates exists in reality, but to attribute to him whiteness by means of this verb is. Therefore, in such propositions, is is predicated as added to the principal predicate. It is said to be the third, not because it is a third predicate, but because it is the third expression in a proposition, and together with the noun which is predicated makes one predicate.[15]

The metaphysical reason on which this function of the verb "to be" in all enunciations is based comes directly from its object, which is not existence in general, but the actual and present "to exist":

> For [is] means that which is understood after the manner of absolute actuality. For is, when it is expressed without qualification, means to be in act, and therefore it has its meaning after the manner of a verb. But the actuality, which is the principal meaning of the verb is, is indifferently the actuality of every form, either substantial or accidental act. Hence it is that when we wish to signify that any form or act actually inheres in any subject, we signify it by this verb is, either simply or according to some qualification—simply, in the present tense; according to some qualification, in the other tenses.[16]

Consequently the knowledge of existence is had through and in a concept in Thomism, not a noun concept but a verb concept. It would be strange if by definition all concepts were abstract and

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[15] "Quandoque vero [est] non praedicatur per se, quasi principale praedicatum, sed quasi conjunctum principali praedicato ad connectendum ipsum subiecto; sicut cum dicitur, Socrates est albus, non est intentio loquentis ut asserat Socratem esse in rerum natura, sed ut attribuat ei albedinem mediante hoc verbo est; et ideo in talibus, est, praedicatur ut adiacens principali praedicato. Et dicitur esse tertium, non quia sit tertium praedicatum, sed quia est tertia dictio posita in enunciatione, quae simul cum nomine praedicato facit unum praedicatum . . ." (Ibid., lect. 2, no. 2).

[16] " . . . [est] significat enim primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolutae: nam est, simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse; et ideo significat per modum verbi. Quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc verbum est, est communiter actualitas omnis formae, vel actus substantialis vel accidentalis, inde est quod cum volumus significare quamcumque formam vel actum actualiter inesse alicui subiecto, significamus illud per hoc verbum est, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid: simpliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus; secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora" (In I Periherm., lect. 5, no. 22).

only had the function of causing the quiddities of things to exist in the soul. It is not of the essence of a concept to be abstract: there are even concepts which cannot be abstract because their intelligibility requires an absence of abstraction.[17] Neither the concept of being as a noun nor that of being as a verb can be the result of an abstraction: for "being" as a noun implies essentially habens esse or quod est, and "being" as a verb implies necessarily the subject of existence whose act it is.[18] This notion of concept would be absurd in Kant since the concept is made up above all "of a priori conditions of understanding"; and existence is not an a priori condition but a fact, an act which is observed and known but is not thought. Consequently, there are concepts in Thomism which neither are nor can be quidditative, because the reality which they signify is not quiddity but being. All analogical concepts enter into this category, and being is the first among them.

3. THE AFFIRMATION OF EXISTENCE

If we admit that "to exist" can and must be known in and by a concept of apprehension, we also admit that there is a second knowledge of "to exist" which comes after the first, controls, and completes it. This is affirmation, an act of judgment, whose soul is neither the subject nor quiddity, nor even the verb or the act of existing but the synthesis of the two, the unification of the substance and of its act par excellence, "to exist." In this synthesis, being is not conceived as a potency to exist, as a correlative of potency-act, but as a substance, as a quod which has its act in actuality. Everything that M. Gilson tells us about the nature of the act of judgment and the points of contact between the two acts (that of the objective being which is the reality and the subjective act which is the judicative activity) seems to me admirably expressed and endowed with great metaphysical and epistemological value (pp. 202-15). One can only envy the keenness of this intellect which has so capably grasped what constitutes the proper value of judicative knowledge in the Angelic Doctor.

And though there be a few divergences between M. Gilson and the present writer on the meaning of certain Thomistic doctrines, it is nonetheless true that if I were to add a name to the Thomistic genealogical tree I would say in all sincerity: Thomas genuit Gilson.

[17] In de Trin., 5. 3.

[18] In I Periherm., lect. 5, no. 20.

THEODICY, NATURAL THEOLOGY, AND METAPHYSICS

Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R.

I. THE PROBLEM OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF GOD

How deeply the nineteenth-century revival of Thomistic philosophy was influenced by alien currents of thought has become increasingly apparent in recent years through historical studies in the fields of epistemology and metaphysics.[1] This phenomenon, viewed from the mid-twentieth-century vantage point, can scarcely appear in any other light than as a historical necessity. The men whose writings constitute the pioneer work in the Thomistic revival had themselves been formed, at least partly, in other types of thinking.[2] They could hardly be expected to have freed themselves completely from the deep influence of modern philosophies in their approach to the medieval texts. It should not be surprising, then, to find that they introduced a number of foreign accretions into the philosophy which they were so laudably aiming to revive. These accretions for the most part have been not only ill-fitting, but have exercised a corroding effect that has caused continued trouble in present-day developments of the principles of St. Thomas.

Is the special science of theodicy or natural theology, as distinct from general metaphysics, another instance of such an accretion?

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[1]E.g., Etienne Gilson, Le Réalisme Méthodique (Paris, Téqui [1936]), pp. 18-39; Réalisme Thomiste et Critique de la Connaissance (Paris: Vrin, 1939), pp. 9-35; Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), pp. 105-7; L.-M. Regis, "La critique néothomiste est-elle Thomiste?" Etudes et Recherches, Ottawa, I (1938), 127-45; G. van Riet, L'Epistémologie Thomiste (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1946), pp. 3-176.

[2]On this point, see the interesting data given by Riet, op. cit.

In the nineteenth-century manuals the philosophical study of God appeared as a distinct treatise, nearly always under the title of either natural theology or theodicy.[3] The two titles were used indifferently.[4] They denote the philosophical study of the existence, nature, attributes, and operations of God. The study was divided from general metaphysics after the manner of the Wolffian distinction between ontology and natural theology.[5]

Has this distinction between the philosophical study of God and the science of being in general any foundation in the Aristotelian tradition or in the Thomistic text?

Certainly no such division appears in the ancient and medieval classifications of the philosophical sciences.[6] Moreover, the possibility of making such a division has recently been rejected, on the ground that a special science of natural theology separates the study of the attributes of God from its proper philosophical basis. Accordingly, natural theology or theodicy disappears as a distinct science, and its functions are again absorbed by general metaphysics.[7]

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[3]E.g., the manuals of Liberatore, Sanseverino, Schiffini, Boeder, Hontheim, De Maria, Remer, Farges-Barbedette, Urraburu, and so on. Similarly other Catholic philosophers of the century, as Balmes, Rosmini, Ubaghs. Even where neither title is used (Tongiorgi, Kleutgen), the division is nevertheless the same.

[4]Cf. G. Ubaghs, Theodiceae seu Theologiae Naturalis Elementa (3rd ed.; Louvain, 1852); Cajetan Sanseverino, Philosophia Christiana (6th ed.; Naples, 1881), II, 296; Joseph Hontheim, Institutiones Theodicaeae sive Theologiae Naturalis (Freiburg: Herder, 1893); Joseph Urraburu, Institutiones Philosophicae (Paris & Rome, 1899), VII, 1, 2.

[5]Christian Wolff, Discursus Praeliminaris de Philosophia in Genere, III, 57, 73, in Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica (3rd ed.; Verona, 1735), pp. 19, 23. Cf. S. Tongiorgi: "Haec metaphysicae partitio a Wolfio jam invecta posterioribus omnibus arrisit, eaque, ut supra dixi, pro praesenti scientiarum ac studiorum conditione opportunissima accidit" (Institutiones Philosophicae [4th ed.; Brussels, 1869], II, 4). M. Liberatore, Institutiones Philosophicae (1a ed. novae formae; Prato, 1881), I, 247-48, has Bacon as well as Wolff in mind in accepting this division. With the turn of the century it was considered to be the classification commonly accepted by the modern Scholastics. Cf. Vincent Remer, Ontologia seu Metaphysica Generalis (4th ed.; Rome, 1921), p. 3, and Sebastian Reinstadler, Elementa Philosophiae Scholasticae (11th ed.; Freiburg: Herder, 1923), I, 266.

[6]A study of these classifications may be found in J. Mariétan, Problème de la Classification des Sciences d'Aristote à St. Thomas (Paris, 1901).

[7]Fernand van Steenberghen, "Réflexions sur la systématisation philosophique," Revue Néoscolastique, XLI (1938), 208; Epistémologie (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1945), p. 219; Ontologie (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1945), p. 219; Ontologie (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1946), p. 10, n. 1; p. 128.

In view of this doubtful status of natural theology or theodicy as a distinct science, a historical survey of the philosophical study of God under these titles may not be without interest at the present moment.

II. THEOLOGY

The speculation of the earliest Greek philosophers was fundamentally a study of God and the divine.[8] The term "theology," however, does not appear before Plato. In his writings it occurs but once and is used to denote the true knowledge of God as distinguished from the fables of the Greek poets.[9] The term and its derivatives are used by Aristotle, in the majority of instances, to designate a type of knowledge which seems contrasted to strictly philosophical thought.[10] But in the two parallel passages in the Metaphysics where the Stagirite classifies the philosophical sciences, "theological" is the technical term used to characterize the primary philosophy.[11] This is the study of the immobile divine beings and is thereby the universal science of being qua being, because it is "primary." The force of "primary" in the specification of a science is clear from the Aristotelian examples of "healthy" and "medical."[12] It means that the science which studies a certain definite nature, such as "health," studies all things which are denominated through reference to that one definite nature. The nature of the separate entities is quite clearly, in the sequence of the Aristotelian presentation,[13] conceived as the nature in reference to which all other things are called beings. In this conception, the Parmenidean and Platonic

[8]On this topic, cf. Werner Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), and "The Pre-Socratic Philosophers as Founders of Theological Philosophy," Library of the Xth International Congress of Philosophy (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co., 1949), I, 1069-71.

[9]Plato Republic ii, 379A.

[10]Cf. Hermann Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, 324b53-325a2; Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers, p. 194, n. 17. Studies of Aristotle's use of the term may be found in Albert Schwegler, Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles (Tübingen, 1847-48), III, 31-33; Paul Natorp, Philosophische Monatshefte, XXIV (1888), 55-64.

[11]Metaphysics vi. 1. 1062a6-32; xi. 7. 1064a30-b14. On the reconciliation of the apparently opposed usages of the term, see Jaeger, op. cit., pp. 4-6.

[12]Aristotle op. cit. iv. 2. 1003a34-b4; xi. 1060b36-1061a7.

[13]Cf. Augustin Mansion, Revue Néoscolastique, XXIX (1927), 329; Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, VII (1945), 123-24.

contrast of being with change or becoming seems operative. Material things are of their own nature mobile, but through imitation they attain by their activity as best they can the eternal and divine.[14] Through this final causality they have their reference to the nature of the separate entities, in which there is no change or becoming. These latter are of their very nature being, in the Greek sense of the absolutely permanent and stable.[15] Such appears to be the conception back of the terse statement that the science of the separate, divine, and immobile entities, the science of being qua being, though treating of one definite nature, is nevertheless universal because it is primary.[16]

"Theology" in this Aristotelian sense is the science which is later called "metaphysics" by the Greek commentators.[17] It is not a branch of metaphysics, nor a section of metaphysics, but is the science of metaphysics itself.[18] In this science, as Asclepius expresses it, Aristotle treats universally of all beings because in it his task is

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[14]Aristotle De Anima ii. 4. 415a26-b7; De Caelo i. 9. 279a17-30; De Generatione et Corruptione ii. 10. 336b27-337a7.

[15]Cf. H. Dimmler, "Der Grundgedanke der aristotelischen Metaphysik," Festgabe Georg von Hertling (Freiburg, 1913), pp. 57-62.

[16]Aristotle Metaphysics vi. 1. 1026a29-31; xi. 7. 1064b11-14. The Aristotelian Metaphysics has been described by Natorp, "Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik," Philosophische Monatshefte, XXIV (1888), 49 ff., and Jaeger, Aristoteles (Berlin, 1923), pp. 222-28, as containing two mutually contradictory conceptions of the object of the primary philosophy. Natorp's view (op. cit., 39) seems to rest on an understanding of the Aristotelian being qua being in the Wolffian sense of an abstract general concept. On Jaeger's interpretation, cf. the careful textual studies by H. von Arnim, "Zu W. Jaegers Grundlegung der Entwicklungsgeschichte des Aristoteles," Wiener Studien, XLIV (1928), 1-48, especially p. 32; E. von Ivanka, "Die Behandlung der Metaphysik in Jaeger's 'Aristoteles,' " Scholastik, VII (1932), 1-29, especially pp. 23-24; and "Die Polemik gegen Plato im Aufbau der aristotelischen Metaphysik," Scholastik, IX (1934), 520-42. These studies vindicate the unity of thought in the traditional Metaphysics, but they have remained little known in comparison with the wide publicity given the opposite view.

[17]Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Metaphys., ed. Hayduck (Berlin, 1891), p. 18, 11. 8-11; p. 175, 11. 5-10; p. 245, 11. 22 ff.; p. 266, 11. 2-18; Pseudo-Alexander, ibid., p. 447, 11. 9 ff.; p. 661, 11. 33-39; Syrianus, In Metaphys., ed. W. Kroll (Berlin, 1902), p. 55, 1. 3; p. 58, 1. 22; Asclepius, In Metaphys., ed. Hayduck (Berlin, 1888), p. 1, 1. 17, to p. 4, 1. 3; p. 232, 1. 4, to p. 236, 1. 6; p. 364, 11. 11-27; Eustratius, In Eth. Nic., ed. Heylbut (Berlin, 1892), p. 42, 11. 10-12.

[18]On the unanimity of ancient Greek tradition in this regard, cf. Natorp, loc. cit., pp. 63-64.

to "theologize."[19]

For the Christian metaphysicians of the Middle Ages the divine nature could hardly be conceived in that Greek manner as forming the subject of a philosophical science. For them the divine nature transcended the scope of unaided human reason. The subject of metaphysics had to be ens commune, which was taken in a sense that was contrasted with the divine being, but which included God as its principle.[20] In this way general metaphysics was the philosophical science which treated of God.

For St. Thomas Aquinas in particular, the theology of the philosophers and the primary philosophy or metaphysics are one and the same science.[21] "Theology" in this sense treats both of things which are never found in matter, such as God and the angels, and of things which in some instances are found in matter and in other instances are not, such as substance, quality, potency and act, and so on.[22] Divine things, in fact, can be treated by the philosophers only insofar as they are the principles of all things.[23] Accordingly,

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[19] ὁ μὲν οὖν σκοπὸς τοῦ παρόντος συγγράμματος εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ᾗ ὄντα ἐστί, καὶ περὶ πάντων ἁπλῶς τῶν ὄντων διαλεχθῆναι, καθὸ ὄντα ἐστί. διὸ καὶ τὸν ὅρον τῆς φιλοσοφίας οὕτως ἐλέγομεν 'γνῶσις τῶν ὄντων, ᾗ ὄντα ἐστίν'. οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τῶν μερικῶν διαλέγεται ἐνταῦθα, οἷον περὶ κομητῶν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Μετεώροις, οὔτε περὶ τῶν καθόλου, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ Περὶ οὐρανοῦ πραγματείᾳ, ἀλλὰ καθόλου περὶ πάντων τῶν ὄντων· θεολογῆσαι γὰρ αὐτῷ πρόκειται ἐν τῷ παρόντι συγγράμματι. Asclepius op. cit., p. 2, 11. 9-16.

[20] E.g., Albertus Magnus, Metaphys., I, 1, 2, Vol. VI of Opera Omnia, ed. Vives, pp. 4-6; Siger of Brabant, Quaest. Metaphys., I, 2, ed. C. A. Graiff (Louvain; Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1948), p. 5, 11. 8-23. Regarding Duns Scotus, cf. J. Owens, "Up to What Point Is God Included in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus?", Mediaeval Studies, X (1948), 173-75.

[21] In de Trin., 2; In Metaphys., prooem., ed. Cathala.

[22] "Quaedam vero speculabilia sunt, quae non dependent a materia secundum esse, quia sine materia esse possunt, sive numquam sint in materia, sicut Deus et angelus, sive in quibusdam sint in materia et in quisbusdam non, ut substantia, qualitas, ens, potentia, actus, unum et multa, et hujusmodi, de quibus omnibus est theologia, id est scientia divina, quia praecipuum in ea cognitorum est Deus, quae alio nomine dicitur Metaphysica . . ." (In de Trin., 5. 1, ed. P. Wyser [Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1948], p. 26, 11. 31-37). The reading "principium" (MS Bordeaux 131, fol. 234rb; ed. Mandonnet) instead of "praecipuum" accords better the doctrine explained in art. 4 of this same fifth Quaestio of de Trin.

[23] "Unde et hujusmodi res divinae non tractantur a philosophis nisi prout sunt omnium rerum principia, et ideo pertractantur in illa doctrina, in qua

the type of theology which treats divine things not as the subject of the science, but as the principle of that subject, is the theology of the philosophers. "Theology" as found in the philosophers, is but another name for metaphysics. The higher type of theology, which treats divine things as the subject of the science, is the theology of the Sacred Scriptures.[24] Metaphysics, then, is "philosophical theology."[25] The reason is that "it belongs to the same science to treat the proper causes of any genus and the genus itself; just as the natural philosopher treats the principles of the natural body."[26] In a word, just as prime matter and substantial form are treated in natural philosophy, so the divine nature is treated in the science of being in general. In both philosophical studies the subject and the principles of the subject have to be treated in the same science.

III. NATURAL THEOLOGY

The term theologia naturalis may possibly have been coined even before the time of St. Augustine, in connection with the threefold division of Varro — namely, mythical, physical, and political theology.[27] It is in this context that the term is used once by St. Thomas Aquinas, meaning the cult given by the philosophers to the parts of the world.[28] This type of idolatry is likewise referred to as "physical theology."[29] In neither instance, however, is the designation meant to indicate a division of the philosophical sciences.

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ponuntur ea, quae sunt communia omnibus entibus, quae habet subjectum ens inquantum est ens, et haec scientia apud eos scientia divina dicitur" (ibid., 5. 4, p. 48, 11. 16-19).

[24]Ibid., 11. 31-33. On the history of the term "theology" as applied to revealed doctrine, see Vacant-Mangenot, Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique, XV, 343-46.

[25]"Theologia ergo philosophica determinat de separatis secundo modo sicut de subjectis, de separatis autem primo modo sicut de principiis subjecti" (In de Trin., 5. 4, p. 49, 11. 4-5). Cf. ST, I. 1 ad 2.

[26]"Ejusdem autem scientiae est considerare causas proprias alicujus generis et genus ipsum; sicut naturalis considerat principia corporis naturalis" (In Metaphys., prooem., ed. Cathala).

[27]St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, VI, 5. 1 and 3. Cf. W. Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers, p. 193, n. 11.

[28]"Tertio theologiam naturalem, quam observaverunt Philosophi in mundo, partes mundi colentes" (In Epist. ad Rom., I, 7; Vol. XX of Opera Omnia, ed. Vives, p. 404b).

[29]ST, II-II. 94. 1.

"Natural theology" is repeated by Suarez in this same signification,[30] but the term is also employed by him to denote the science of metaphysics.[31] In this latter sense it means metaphysics in general, and not a branch or subdivision of the science. Although the Disputationes Metaphysicae mark the break with the Aristotelian order of presentation, they show no tendency to group the problems concerning God into one special section which would follow the treatment of being in general.

Suarez likewise does not hesitate to use the expression "natural metaphysics."[32] The use of the term "natural" in conjunction with either "theology" or "metaphysics" seems to inject a certain confusion into the traditional Aristotelian terminology for the classification of the philosophical sciences. "Natural" had been contrasted with "metaphysical" or "theological" as well as with "mathematical," to denote the difference between natural philosophy and the other speculative sciences.[33] Here it denotes the contrast between the natural and the supernatural, in the sense of what is known by reason and what is known by faith only.

In the sense of this latter contrast, Francis Bacon in classifying the sciences distinguishes inspired or sacred theology and "natural theology."[34] He sets up natural theology as a science distinct both from metaphysics and from first philosophy. "First philosophy" becomes the science of the axioms and of the adventitious conditions of beings. These latter are the transcendentals, that is, the relative notions common to all things.[35] First philosophy is in this way a uni-

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[30]Francis Suarez, De Virtute et Statu Religionis, III, 2, 8-9; Vol. XIII of Opera Omnia, ed. Vives, p. 485.

[31]"Hinc rursus naturalis theologia vocatur ex. l. 6 Metaph., c. 1 et lib. 11, c. 6, quoniam de Deo ac divinis rebus sermonem habet, quantum ex naturali lumine haberi potest; ex quo etiam metaphysica nominata est . . ." (Disp. Metaphys., I, Vol. XXV, ed. Vives, p. 2a).

[32]". . . ergo idem erit de naturali metaphysica, ut sub inferiori lumine procedit . . ." (Ibid., I, 5, 3; Vol. XXV, ed. Vives, p. 38a).

[33]E.g., St. Thomas Aquinas, text cited supra, n. 26. Cf. also Duns Scotus: "Igitur Metaphysica et naturalis scientia sunt de eodem per accidens; sed de Deo est naturalis magis per accidens" (Quaest. Metaphys., I, 49, Vol. VII of Opera Omnia, ed. Vives, p. 37a). When Scotus states that the demonstration of the primary being is not based on any "ratio naturaliter cognoscibilis" (ibid., I, 44, p. 33b), he does not mean that God cannot be known by the light of natural reason, but that the proof is not taken from natural philosophy.

[34]Francis Bacon, De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum, III, 1, 2-3, Vol. II of Works, ed. Spedding, Ellis, Heath (New York, 1869), pp. 252-62.

[35]Ibid., III, 1, 4, 6, pp. 253-58; III, 4, 2, pp. 266-67.

versal science.[36] Metaphysics, on the other hand, becomes a branch of natural philosophy and treats the formal and final causes of material things.[37] Accordingly, God is studied in neither first philosophy nor in metaphysics, but in a special branch of philosophy called "natural theology." Bacon recognizes that up to his time this natural theology had not been separated from the primary philosophy.[38]

With Francis Bacon, then, appears the notion of a philosophical science of God which is distinct from the primary philosophy. It seems quite clearly a product of the decomposition of the traditional Aristotelian metaphysics.

Bacon's divisions, however, did not become the current classification of the sciences. In the Cartesian treatment, the study of God remains an integral part of first philosophy.[39] With Locke, it comes under natural philosophy.[40] But with Christian Wolff a distinction quite similar to that of Bacon reappears between first philosophy and natural theology. First philosophy or ontology deals with being in general and the general affections of being.[41] These latter are general notions, which are not treated in the particular sciences.[42] They are the ordinary general notions which everybody has, but they are artificially elaborated in the science of ontology,

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[36]Ibid., III, 1, 4, p. 253.

[37]Ibid., III, 4, 1-2, pp. 266-67.

[38]"Equidem invenio farraginem quamdam et massam inconditam doctrinae ex Theologia Naturali, ex Logica, ex partibus quibusdam Physicae (velut de Principiis et de Anima), compositam et congestam; et sublimitate quadam sermonis, hominum qui seipsos admirari amant, tanquam in vertice scientiarum collocatam" (Ibid., III, 1, 4, p. 253).

[39]Cf. Réné Descartes, Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, Vol. VII of Oeuvres de Descartes, Publiées par Charles Adam et Paul Tannery (13 vols.; Paris: Cerf, 1897-1913), pp. 17ff.; IX, 13 ff. Similarly Spinoza in the Ethics does not separate the treatment of substance in general from the treatment of God. In the Cogitata Metaphysica, he distinguishes the questions which occur in the general part of metaphysics, concerning being and its affections, from those in the special part, regarding God and the human mind.

[40]John Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, IV, 21, 2, ed. A. C. Fraser ([Oxford: 1894], II, 461).

[41]Cf. Wolff, Discursus Praeliminaris, III, 73; Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia, Prolegomena, 1 ([3rd ed.; Verona: 1736], p. 1). On the origin of "ontology" in J. Clauberg, cf. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, pp. 112-13. Wolff (Ontologia, Prolegomena, 7 [(1736), p. 3], acknowledges Clauberg's attempt to reform metaphysics, but considers it insufficient.

[42]Discursus Praeliminaris.

just as natural logic is elaborated by artificial logic.[43] God, as a particular being, is treated in a special part of philosophy, which is called natural theology.[44] With Wolff, the distinction between ontology and natural theology becomes currently accepted.

IV. THEODICY

The word "theodicy" was coined by Leibniz as the projected title of a defense of the justice of God against difficulties arising from contingence and fate, liberty and predestination.[45] This work seems to have occupied the interest of Leibniz over a long period of years. It was finally published as a reply to Bayle in the year 1710. Leibniz stated that he used the title "theodicy" because the justice of God was the principal subject of the work.[46] This explains the derivation of the term as meaning the "justice of God." The Greek δίκη , which originally meant custom or usage, later acquired a number of meanings in connection with the procedure of the law courts. It could mean justice, or the lawsuit, the trial, the pleading, the judgment, or the penalty. In the title of the Latin synopsis,[47] published along with the Essais de Theodicée, Leibniz seems to imply that he is pleading the case of God on the grounds of the divine justice. He is engaged in an Apologetica Causae Dei tractatio.[48] It is not surprising, then, that the sense of "the justification of God" has been attached to the work "theodicy,"[49] as though its etymology signified a defense of God before the bar of intellectual opinion. Whatever merits this later derivation may have from an apologetic point of view, it makes the title rather monstrous from the standpoint of philosophy. Philosophically God requires no justification, but rather the justice of God is the primary instance of that virtue and is thus the justification of all else.

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[43]Ontologia, Prolegomena, 21-24, pp. 7-8.

[44]Discursus Praeliminaris, III, 57.

[45]Cf. G. Grua, G. W. Leibnitz, Textes Inédits (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1948), I, 370.

[46]"Je me sers du titre de Théodicée, par ce que la justice de Dieu est le sujet principal de cet ouvrage . . ." (ibid., II, 495). Cf. 1, 370.

[47]Causa Dei Asserta per Justitiam Ejus, Cum caeteris ejus Perfectionibus Cunctisque Actionibus Conciliatam (Amsterdam, 1710).

[48]Ibid., 1, p. 3.

[49]E.g., A. Franck, Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques (2d ed.; Paris, 1875) II, 1719a; André Lalande, Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie (nouvelle éd.; Paris, 1928), II, 885.

But whatever force the word may have had with Leibniz as it was finally employed in the title of the published work, it was used by him as the name of a treatise defending the Christian notion of God against difficulties arising from the freedom of man and the existence of evil. This defense was not specifically philosophical. It was based on the light of revelation as well as the light of reason. It drew upon the Sacred Scriptures, grace, and the future life as revealed by divine faith.[50]

In its origin with Leibniz, then, the term "theodicy" did not denote a specifically philosophical study. The word did not attain general currency until the early nineteenth century. It was used by Victor Cousin to denote the whole philosophical study of God, without any special reference to a merely apologetic character.[51] Under Cousin's tenure of office in the French ministry of public instruction it became for succeeding decades the standard title of one of the four branches of the philosophical curricula, corresponding to the "natural theology" of the Wolffian classification.[52] In this sense it was in one way broader than in its original signification with Leibniz, for it extended to all the philosophical knowledge concerning God. In another way it was narrower, for it was restricted to reason unaided by faith. In this background it was used along with "natural theology" by the nineteenth-century Scholastics to denote the special philosophical study of God.

V. METAPHYSICS AND NATURAL THEOLOGY

The above historical survey shows clearly enough that the special science of natural theology or theodicy, as distinct from general metaphysics, arose from the decomposition of the traditional primary philosophy. The story of how the subject of metaphysics was gradually "emptied" of real being has been told in recent works.[53] In this background of abstraction from all real being, from

[50] Essais de Théodicée, I, §1 (Amsterdam: 1710), pp. 105-6.

[51] E.g., Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie Moderne, 2e Serie (nouvelle éd.; Paris, 1847), II, 212-14.

[52] On this history of the term "theodicy," cf. P. Larousse, Grand Dictionnaire Universel du XIXe Siècle, XV, 78ab. The two were not always completely identified. Rosmini (Theodicy, English trans., [London, 1912], I, v-ix) considered theodicy to be a branch of natural theology.

[53] E.g., André Marc, L'Idée de l'Etre chez St. Thomas et dans la Scolastique Postérieure (Paris: Beauchesne, 1933); Gilson, L'Etre et l'Essence (Paris: Vrin, 1948), 121-222, and Being and Some Philosophers, pp. 74-142.

bodies, souls, and God, general metaphysics could easily be shown by Kant to admit no given object,[54] by Hegel to be a logic,[55] and by Collingwood to deal not with being at all, but with the absolute presuppositions of persons or groups of persons.[56] The being which is conceived as the subject of such a metaphysics is the equivalent of nothing. It is a concept whose derivation is attempted after the manner of "total abstraction," and leaves no actuality in its object. Being, unlike the genera, manifests no nature over and above its differences.[57]

When attained by "formal abstraction"[58]—whatever this process may be in regard to being, whose proper act can be only equivocally[59] called a form—being may confuse its components under some common order, but it cannot abstract from them after the manner of a generic universal. What that ens metaphysicale is, seemed to Cajetan to have remained unknown even to the most learned men up to his time.[60] Today it is still a matter of much debate. St. Thomas himself did not build up a metaphysics as such. But if the present-day developments in interpreting the metaphysical doctrines of Aquinas from the viewpoint of existential act are to achieve success, they would seem to prohibit any science of being in general which is not thereby the science of the real principle of being, God.[61] The act of existing is attained by the human intellect not through conceptualization, but through judgment, and immediately in finite things only. In these things the existential act lacks the characteristic of necessity that is required for any scientific treat-

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[54]". . . ohne Objekte anzunehmen, die gegeben wären (Ontologia)." K.R.V. A845.

[55]Wissenschaft der Logik, no. 24.

[56]R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), p. 47.

[57]"Sed enti non potest addi aliquid quasi extranea natura, per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subjecto; quia quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens . . ." (De Ver., I. 1).

[58]The terms "total abstraction" and "formal abstraction" are Cajetan's, In De Ente et Essentia, I. 5, ed. M. H. Laurent ([Turin: Marietti, 1934], pp. 6-7).

[59]St. Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, IV, ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin (Kain [Belgique], 1926), p. 35, 11. 23-25.

[60]"Secundo modo ens est terminus metaphysicalis; et forte adhuc viris doctissimis non innotuit" (Cajetan, op. cit., p. 6).

[61]Cf. Gilson's remark: "Strictly speaking, an ontology is a metaphysics without natural theology, because it is a metaphysics without existence" (Being and Some Philosophers, p. 119).

ment. How can such an act be scientifically treated except in reference to the Being whose essence is to exist, in whom the act of existing is absolutely necessary? For St. Thomas, the corporeal world alone is directly known. The bodies which make up this world can be treated from the viewpoint of their essence; and in this light they have as principles their intrinsic causes, matter and form. In a higher science these same corporeal things can be treated from the viewpoint of their existential act, and in this metaphysical study their principle is God, as efficient and final cause. Such seems to be the conception of St. Thomas in maintaining that the same science which treats ens commune has to treat the universal and primary causes of being, just as the natural philosopher considers the principles of a natural body.[62] This should mean that in a Thomistic existential metaphysics there is no possibility of distinguishing a general metaphysics from a philosophical theology.

[62] "Nam praedictae substantiae separatae sunt universales et primae causae essendi. Ejusdem autem scientiae est considerare causas proprias alicujus generis et genus ipsum: sicut naturalis considerat principia corporis naturalis. Unde oportet quod ad eamdem scientiam pertineat considerare substantias separatas, et ens commune, quod est genus cujus sunt praedictae substantiae communes et universales causae" (In Metaphys., prooem., ed. Cathala, p. 2ab).

CAUSALITY IN THE CLASSROOM

Francis C. Wade, S.J.

The subject of education has grown vast by growing confused. There are two confusions about it. First, educationists confuse education, which is a matter of doing something, with being educated, which is a matter of knowing something. To educate is an art. To be educated is, at the very least, to know something. Now it is possible to be educated without being to any distinctive degree an educator. But it is not possible to be an educator without being educated. Yet educationists, after dressing up their art like a science, propose to educate by teaching "teaching,"[1] even though their "teaching" does not teach anything. And by this fundamental confusion they have made their subject as vast as it is indefinite. Indeed, it is vast because it is indefinite. The second confusion follows from the first. Having blotted out the distinction between practical (how to educate) and speculative science (what an education is), educationists have no way of recognizing and answering a practical question when one turns up. To the practical question—that is, how to educate—they answer this: An educator is a leader who is inspiring, sympathetic, enthusiastic, dramatic, and so on and so forth. All these characteristics could equally well characterize a successful insurance salesman. They do not describe an educator. A description of an educator ought to tell us what he does when he teaches.

I propose to answer that question.[2]

Our question then is this: What precisely does any teacher do whenever he is exercising his art of teaching? Many personal

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[1]See Albert Lynd, "Quackery in the Public Schools," Atlantic Monthly, CLXXXV (March, 1950), 33-38.

[2]This question was raised at the Faculty Discussion Forum of Marquette University. The answer given here owes more than inspiration to St. Thomas's discussion on the teacher in ST, I. 117. 1 and De Ver., 11. 1.

abilities may aid him in his work, making him a better artist. But we are not asking about these, not because they are not important, but because we cannot judge of their real value before we know what the value is important for. Also, for purposes of clarity, we shall limit the discussion to teaching speculative knowledge, as opposed to teaching practical knowledge, that is, how to do or make something. And we shall suppose that though anyone can learn by himself, no one can teach himself. Thus our problem has the following points: (a) a teacher possessing the knowledge; and (b) a student who does not possess the knowledge before being taught, but only after having been taught. And we ask: What is done when a teacher causes a student's knowledge?

Now, any answer given to our question supposes some judgment about what it is to begin to know. Here is a student. Before he attended the class, he did not know; after the class he does know. How account for this new knowledge? There are two extreme answers to this question. You can say (a) that the "new" knowledge is not really new, that it was there all the time, but the student was not aware of it; or (b) that it wasn't there in any sense but came to the student wholly from the outside, as coffee comes into a cup. Once either of these positions is taken, your explanation is pretty well determined in its main lines.

Take the first answer. It runs straight at the problem. The student does have the knowledge after being taught; yet there is no way of explaining how he passed from not having it to having it. Therefore he must have had it all the time. But it seems that he begins to know. Then this "seeming" needs to be accounted for. Plato thought that minds lived in a former existence and there knew everything.[3] When they were put into the body, their knowledge was still present but obscured. By the proper questioning a mind could be stirred up to recall what it formerly knew. Plato even worked out an educational experiment on a slave boy to bolster his position.[4] Teaching, consequently, could be no more than encouraging a student to recall.

Contemporaries, too, hold this position. They would hardly, of course, talk of a pre-existent mind; indeed they talk none too clearly even about mind, whether existent or pre-existent. They do think,

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[3]Plato Meno 80. Plato is talking of certain knowledge (φρόνησις), not of right opinion (δόξα). In the Republic, Bk. VI, education is turning to the light of the Ideas and the Good.

[4]Plato Meno 82-84.

however, that to learn is to organize responses. As Dewey put it, "Speaking accurately, all direction is but re-direction; it shifts the activities already going on into another channel."[5] In other words, the difference between a student knowing and not knowing is only a difference between unorganized responses and organized ones. In any case the responses were there all the time; nothing new is added; the old is merely rearranged. And since rearranging is, according to Dewey, knowledge, knowledge was already in the student before it was taught. It needed only rearrangement. On this basis, teaching, now called progressive, is no more than encouraging a student to organize his own actual responses towards social utility.

The first answer, then, both ancient and contemporary, leaves very little for the teacher to do, because no change really takes place. With nothing to do that is vital to the student's taught knowledge, the teacher bustles about the learner, opening windows, keeping records, planning better desks and plumbing. He arouses curiosity; he encourages; he comforts; he sets up circumstances that will call out this or that response. But he never gets into the student's act of learning. And his "causality" is completely external and purely dispositive. It no more accounts for the student's new knowledge than good health accounts for success in athletics or a traffic cop accounts for my driving downtown.

The second answer, exactly opposed to the first, says that learning is entirely from the outside. Here, too, the ancients hit the problem head on.[6] They maintained that since the student, before being taught, did not know and, after being taught, did know, knowledge must therefore have come from some outside source. Moreover, this outside source must be big enough to produce knowledge. No man is up to this. So, it takes a pure intellect that necessarily knows and consequently can send out this knowledge like rays from the sun. The student's job was to receive this knowledge; and whatever he did on his own was merely preparatory to his passive reception of this knowledge from the outside. Again, contemporaries duplicate the main lines of the ancients' answer. Without the attempted metaphysical justification of teaching, but

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[5]John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1926), p. 31. Cf. p. 74 where he says that we do not refine original impulse activity, but select the response most useful in the face of a definite stimulus and co-ordinate the different factors of the response which takes place.

[6]See Avicenna, De Anima, Pars V, c. 5.

convinced nonetheless that knowledge is wholly from the outside, the moderns hit upon the teacher as the giver of knowledge. The teacher has knowledge; he passes it on by teaching; the student merely takes it from the teacher. Teaching then becomes the handing on of knowledge, quite as physical objects are handed on from one person to another.

Just as the first answer left little for the teacher to do, so this second answer leaves little for the student. According to the second answer, the student becomes a sort of sensitive sponge, receiving patiently and holding by memory what the teacher pours into or over him. With the student's role reduced to receiving and the teacher's function to giving, the question remains, Can the human teacher put knowledge into a student's mind like that? Were knowledge like marbles and the mind like a sack, it would be no trick to pass on knowledge. But the problem persists precisely because knowledge is not like marbles and minds are not like sacks. Even if they were, the account would not be satisfactory. For then a teacher who passed on knowledge would lose the knowledge he gave to the student; and, thus, to teach would be to talk oneself out of a job. Moreover, a student, according to that explanation, would never really possess knowledge, any more than the sack possesses the marbles put into it.

After rejecting both answers, we are now left with two negations on our hands. Our denial of the first answer leaves us with this proposition: Students do not have the knowledge they are taught, before they are taught. And our denial of the second answer leaves us with this proposition: Students cannot be given knowledge by the teacher as they might be given candy bars. Neither proposition, considered singly, is too jarring. Take the beginner in physics. He does not know what mass is. Nor does the teacher pass him this knowledge as he does a blue-book for a quiz; otherwise every student would know what mass is at the end of the period. Yet both statements, taken together, are very nearly unintelligible. If the student does not somehow know what mass is before the class, but does know it after, then his knowledge must have come from some source. Yet not, we agreed, from the student; he did not have it before the class. Nor can it, we agreed, come from a teacher handing it over to him; otherwise the teacher would be out his knowledge. Whence then is this new knowledge of mass?

It might look like a way out of the maze to say that the student does not have knowledge of mass but is in potency to it, much as cold water is in potency to heat. But this does not help much, be-

cause though fire in the real sense gives heat to the water, it does not give away its heat to the water; nor, according to our second proposition, does the teacher give away his knowledge to the student. This is to say that beginning to know is like—but not quite like—beginning to be hot. Knowing has its own difficulties, as Plato saw and stated clearly. Either we know what we are looking for, or we do not. If we know, there is no point in seeking; if we do not know, we can never tell when we find it.[7] There is no escaping this dilemma if knowing is like other changes.

The point is that the genesis of knowledge in a student is not quite like the genesis of heat in water. Nor is the potency to become hot quite like the potency to know. Cold water only receives heat; it cannot on its own become hot. But the student in potency to knowledge can know on his own. To know is at least to exercise one's own act. When a mind is presented with sensible reality and acts as a mind, the least we can say of it is that it knows; that is, it does the knowing. And this act of knowing is knowledge. Consequently, knowledge is not merely a perfection which is receivable; there is more to it than that. There is activity on the part of the student.

Moreover, this activity of the student is not active in the same way regarding all types of data. Some things the student understands without being taught; other things he sees in the light of untaught knowledge. For example, a child knows an apple first of all as something, and then, if he eats it, as something good to eat; or he knows the apple is red, because he sees it is. But whether he knows the apple as edible or red, he could not know either unless he knew that apples are not not-apples, or that red is not not-red. If the principles of contradiction and identity were not present to his mind, he could never affirm with certainty, "The apple is red." For without these principles in his mind the red apple could just as well stand in his mind as not-apple and as not-red; he could affirm nothing because he would know nothing to affirm. In order to know anything beyond them, therefore, he must actually know being and its first principles. Such knowledge—that is, of being and its first principles—is untaught. It is acquired, yes; but not by being taught. It is another kind of knowledge which is taught, not the knowledge of the principles of being.

We are now in a position to clarify our propositions. The first one was that a student does not have knowledge before he is

[7]Plato Meno 80.

taught. This means that he does not know, before being taught, what he is taught. But he does know what he is not taught, and what no one can teach him: being and its first principles. This knowledge was acquired without the aid of a teacher. This acquired but untaught knowledge is the solid ground from which both teaching and learning shove off. Now recall our second proposition: A student cannot be given knowledge. This means that he cannot be given knowledge in the same way he can be given a blue-book; nor in quite the same way that water is given heat. But it does not mean that his taught knowledge is not caused by the teacher. Consider the data. Both teacher and student have actual knowledge of first principles. Beyond that knowledge, the teacher also has actual knowledge of their application, while the student has not. The teacher, by the arts of grammar and rhetoric, points out the lines from the application to the principles, so that the case is seen in the clear light of known principles. And the student, by following the teacher, also sees the lines connecting the case to the already known principles and can then affirm this truth as seen by himself. This affirmation is his own act, not the teacher's; yet it is caused by the teacher's art at the same time that it is caused by the student.

Let us take a case of teaching something. To make it concrete let our task be to teach the Thomistic notion of potency. We are aware of the two pitfalls: (a) to think potency is nothing; (b) to think it is a shadowy something. We begin by saying potency is the ability to become. Very little progress here; nothing but blank stares from the class. We begin again, this time with a question. Does a brick know geometry? No. Can a brick ever know geometry? No. Can the baby? Yes. Then the no knowledge of geometry in the baby really means no actual knowledge of geometry but potential knowledge of geometry. Let us move on. This no knowledge of geometry in the baby, is it no knowledge of the first ten theorems, or of the first two, or of just a little bit of geometry, say, a postulate or two? It is no knowledge of geometry, not even of a postulate, any more than there is knowledge of geometry in a brick. But though neither actually knows geometry, the baby nevertheless can know it .Suppose we give a name to this no actual knowledge of geometry but potency to know. We shall call it potential knowledge of geometry. Then we can say that potency is not a something, not even a shadowy something; nor is it simply nothing. It is between nothing and something, a nothing ordered to something.

What went on in this teaching of the notion of potency? First

of all, the teacher knew what potency was. This knowledge he could have expressed clearly by talking about becoming, about the determinable principle of reality, about an ens quo. But he might well have been merely talking without teaching. He began to teach when he talked about things the student had actual knowledge of—bricks, babies, and geometry. Included in the student's actual knowledge were the following propositions (lighted by their principles):

1. that bricks are bricks and babies, babies(whatever is, is);
2. that babies can grow up and learn (whatever is, can be);
3. that some youth know geometry (whatever is, is);
4. that bricks do not grow up and never know geometry (what is not, is not).

Knowing these truths the student already knows cases of potency, but he does not see what the cases involve, that is, potency. Obviously, the art of the teacher consists precisely in presenting these known data in such a way that the potency principle in these cases becomes present in the mind of the student.

But this is no more than saying that the teacher teaches. The question still remains, How does the teacher do this? In other words, What is it to teach? To teach is to use signs[8] of one's own knowledge, which knowledge is by hypothesis knowledge of things. The student receives these signs through his senses as signifying the teacher's knowledge about things. Thus signs, in the last analysis, take the place of things they signify.[9] Playing the role of object, they also exert the causality of the object. For there is a line of causality from the real to the intellect. In the face of the evidently real a thinking mind knows that reality. And though the mind is the efficient cause of its own knowledge, the object nevertheless acts to specify what it is that is known. So also does the object's substitute, the sign. The teacher's sign can, however, have one advantage over the object in nature. For this natural object exists under the conditions of matter and is therefore actually sensible and only potentially intelligible. The teacher's words, on the other hand, are signs of his own knowledge, in which the object is already actually intellectualized. So the student, through the teacher's words, is presented with a substitute object much closer to his own

[8]The teacher's signs are primarily words, though gestures and inflections help.

[9]For the philosophy of the sign see John of St. Thomas, Cursus Philosophicus, Vol. I, Logica, Pars 2, q. 21 (Paris: Vives, 1933), p. 559.

intellect and therefore most easily known than the raw, unprepared reality is.

But we have not yet come to the essential role of the teacher. Not only the teacher, but the writer, too, presents knowledge through signs, and the reader learns from him. If the writer can do the teacher's work, why not get rid of the teachers and buy better texts? Teachers are of course got rid of, but others always take their places, no matter how good the texts are. The essential role of the teacher must be other than the writer's. And it is. Both present knowledge through signs. But the writer prepares one set of signs for imaginary readers and freezes his signs in type, while the living teacher, before living students, adapts his signs to fit the students before him. Blank stares, puzzled faces, pointless questions, all warn the teacher that he and his students are in the rough. The artist-teacher then varies his signs until those present get back on the fairway again. The role, therefore, essential to the teacher is to adapt signs so that the object, present to the teacher's mind, becomes present to the living students before him. We might also say that the teacher, by adapting his signs, brings knowledge to today's students. Better still, he brings today's students to knowledge.

Perhaps we should try to give a name to this causality of teaching. We can say that the teacher is the efficient cause of the words as signs and of their being presented to the student. Then his signs take over and exert an intentional causality, which is in the line of specification rather than of efficiency. With an object present to his mind, the student acts to form his own knowledge. Thus the student is the efficient cause of his own taught knowledge; and the teacher, through his signs as logical instruments, is the specificative cause of the student's taught knowledge.

What we have said about teaching points to two important conclusions. First, a student, to be teachable, must be willing, with the aid of his teacher, to commit himself to a yes or no. If he refuses to be helped, he cannot be taught. On the other hand, if he refuses to commit himself personally, he cannot be taught. No one can give him this assent; no one can do it for him. Nor can he do it without getting into water where he either drowns or swims. There is no other way to be taught.

The second conclusion pertains to the teacher. It is this: If the teacher divorces his teaching from first principles, he does not teach: he indoctrinates. For teaching is possible only because the truth of the first principles unites the teacher and the taught. And the two minds not united in truth are not minds united at all. Assent,

where minds meet in truth, requires a meeting ground occupied by both minds. This ground is the truth of first principles. Without such meeting ground teacher and taught do not meet as minds; there is no ground for the student's assent. What is left the student is a pseudoground; that is, the teacher said so. Such a student, assenting on the word of the teacher, is indoctrinated, not taught. True, he gets something; but he gets it by hearing and holds it by memory and becomes a skilled repeater instead of a knowing man. His teacher, on the other hand, cut off from first principles, must go on indoctrinating, whether he wants to or not, for there is no escape. Let him try to escape by being "objective" and by professedly refusing to take sides. Still he does have opinions and these must color his teaching; he, after all, like other teachers, can only teach what he knows. The student, meanwhile, who is told he is getting uncolored truth, does not even suspect that he is lapping up, without reason, opinions that demand reasons. Thus the unprincipled teacher, running from open indoctrination, stumbles into the more vicious trap of masked[10] indoctrination. What would save him and his teaching and his students' mind is appeal to the first principles of being.

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[10]Compare John Wild, Introduction to Realistic Philosophy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1948), pp. 4-5.

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESSES IN ROME

GERALD VAN ACKEREN, S.J.

The Third International Thomistic Congress was held at Rome, September 11 to 17, 1950, under the auspices of the Pontifical Roman Academy of St. Thomas. The general theme for the congress was the relation between philosophy and religion. Over eighty papers were presented by representatives from twelve different countries. Professor Anton C. Pegis, president of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, was the only representative from North America to read a paper.

Because of the large number of papers to be read, the discussions were relegated to a separate afternoon session each day. Some of these discussions turned out to be very profitable, especially when such men as Professor Gilson, Monsignor de Raeymaeker, Monsignor Parente, Father Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., Father Van Steenberghen, and Father Lotz, S.J., were being questioned.

At the close of the congress, a resolution was taken that the Academy of St. Thomas, Roman and International, should consider it its proper task during the coming year to prepare a commentary on the encyclical Humani Generis. The next International Thomistic Congress will be held in 1955.

The papers read at the congress will be published in the second and third fascicles of Doctor Communis for 1950. They will also be published in a separate volume of Acta.

The First International Scholastic Congress was also held in Rome during the week immediately preceding the Thomistic Congress. It was organized under the direction of the Pontificium Athen-

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THE REVEREND GERALD VAN ACKEREN, S.J., has just completed his studies for the S.T.D. at the Gregorian University. He was formerly an associate editor of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN.

aeum Antonianum, the Pontifical Theological Faculty of St. Bonaventure, and the International College of St. Laurence, Brindisi. The principal objective of this assembly was the formation of a definitive notion of Scholasticism. No general agreement, however, could be reached in regard to this notion. At the last session Professor Gilson tactfully pulled together the threads of the discussion and delivered a brilliant paper on "Historical Research and the Future of Scholasticism."

THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE MISSOURI STATE PHILOSOPHY ASSOCIATION

R. J. HENLE, S.J.

The Missouri State Philosophy Association held its third annual meeting at the University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri, November 3 and 4. The meeting opened on the afternoon of November 3 with a symposium dealing with current Existentialism. Doctor James Collins of Saint Louis University presented "The Existentialism of Sartre." Two criticisms of the existential position were offered, one, "Thomistic Critique of Existentialism" by Venant Cauchy, Saint Louis University, and the other "Existentialism and Crisis Theology" by James Spalding of Missouri Valley College.

At the annual dinner, Doctor Lewis E. Hahn, Director of the Department of Philosophy at Washington University, presented his presidential address, "Metaphysical Interpretation." Doctor Hahn examined the various metaphysical systems in the light of their "root metaphors" or initial set of categories through which they attempt to give an integral view of reality. He suggested that the validity of a system could be determined by the success with which it could organize reality. Doctor Hahn also attempted to distinguish metaphysics from scientific fields and to determine its independence by appealing to its character as a total and all-embracing view.

THE REVEREND ROBERT J. HENLE, S.J., is an associate editor of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, dean of the Graduate School of Saint Louis University, and assistant professor of philosophy.

At the annual business meeting, Reverend Robert J. Henle, S.J., Dean of the Graduate School of Saint Louis University, was elected President and Miss Caroline G. Nations of Saint Louis was re-elected Secretary-Treasurer.

At the morning meeting on Saturday, three independent papers were presented. Mrs. Mildred Bakan of the University of Missouri presented "Logical Inference and Being," in which she attempted to escape the difficulties of Pure Rationalism as well as those of Empiricism by grounding rational principles upon experience as given. The point within experience at which she attempted to anchor the principles was the given unity of experience. Doctor Alexander D. Gordon of the University of Missouri outlined the Theory of Ethics of E. Jordan, and Doctor John J. Kessler of Washington University concluded with a short explanation of Semantics entitled "General Semantics as Philosophy and as Methodology."

The Program Committee for the next annual meeting is composed of the following members: Doctor Guy A. Ransom, Chairman (William Jewell College), Doctor W. Donald Oliver (University of Missouri), and Mr. Huston Smith (Washington University).

At the conclusion of the general meeting on Saturday morning, the following resolution was adopted and the President was instructed to forward copies of it to all interested parties:

"Resolution concerning academic freedom at the University of California, adopted by the Missouri State Philosophy Association, November 4, 1950, at Columbia, Missouri:

Inasmuch as the Missouri State Philosophy Association is inherently concerned with the protection and development of the intellectual and educational life of our state, and therefore—since basic intellectual and educational values are not geographically divisible—of our country as a whole, this Association cannot but be concerned by recent developments at the University of California. The Association does therefore resolve:

(1) That it opposes any attempt to limit academic freedom, however admirable may be the motive;

(2) That is opposes any procedures for evaluating educational and scholarly competence by agencies composed of persons other than educators and scholars;

(3) That is expresses its admiration of our colleague, Professor J. Loewenberg, for thirty-five years a distinguished teacher of philosophy at the University of California, who has refused to sign an oath which he regards as an inroad upon academic freedom. We lament the spirit of the Regents in looking upon such

fidelity to principle as an act of insubordination. And as an association which includes a number of members who are products of the philosophy department of the University of California, and who owe so much to its great past, we deplore the serious weakening of the future of this department, which the dismissing of Professor Loewenberg will certainly entail.

(4) That it commends the American Psychological Association and the American Mathematical Association for recommending that their members do not accept appointments at the University of California until conditions conducive to security of tenure have been re-established there."

CHRONICLE

The Constitutional Committee of the Metaphysical Society of America has submitted a draft of the constitution to the present members for their approval. Members of the committee were Ellen Haring, chairman, George Burch, and George Schrader, Jr. The annual discussion meeting continues to be the big feature of the program.

An important source for the understanding of the present concrete workings of American government is the book Lobbying, Direct and Indirect (Part 5 of the Hearings before the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, obtainable from the Government Printing Office at $3.50). A study of the report will reveal that many groups in this country are apparently unmoved by any desire to promote the common good, but seek to apply various kinds of indirect pressure to secure private advantage or privilege. It is true that private good (of individuals or groups) is legitimately sought, just as it is true that some of the aims even of the most selfish of lobbyists have been good aims. The question is: Can democracy survive when large numbers of citizens do not even recognize their obligation to the common good? Secondly, the presence and partial need for lobbying points to the need for some revision of our democratic structures and institutions, so that our legislators cannot avoid having the information they ought to have for making good laws, without at the same time being subject to vociferous pressure groups of various kinds.

The Hearnshaw series of texts on social and political thought is again available (New York: Barnes and Noble). The present edition is a corrected reprint.

Early in 1951 the University of Hawaii will begin the publication of Philosophy—East and West. This journal is devoted to comparative philosophy and has as its aims the promotion of world unity through a synthesis of the different philosophies. The editor is to be Charles A. Moore.

The Instituto de Filosofia of the National University of La Plata (Argentine) has begun a new publication, Revista de Filosofia. Under the editorship of Octavio N. Derisi the journal will be an organ for the literary activities of the members of the institute.

With Doctor A. C. Crombie as its editor, the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science appeared in May, 1950. The editorial board is made up of a number of distinguished professors.

The distinguished philosopher M. Jacques Maritain, now at the Institute of Advanced Studies, has been made an officer of the Legion of Honor. THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN wishes to congratulate him on this new recognition of his achievements.

The Fifth Congress of the Sociétés de Langue Française was held at Bordeaux, September 14 to 17, 1950. The theme of the congress was "Science and Wisdom."

A German congress of philosophy was held at Bremen, October 2 to 7. The following themes were treated: might and right; historical materialism and the problem of ideology; the philosophical presuppositions of logistics; the problem of the Umwelt; human consciousness, speech, and poetry; and existential analysis and the clarification of existence.

At the Congress of Bremen, the Allgemeine Gesellschaft fur Philosophie in Deutschland, which was founded in Mainz, March, 1950, held a meeting and an election of officers. The temporary chairman, Professor J. von Rinteler, presided.

The Philosophische Gesellschaft of Bonn was again activated, February 7, 1950.

An Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur has been formed in Mainz. Its president is Karl Willy Wagner.

The German translation of St. Thomas, begun in Salzburg in 1933, had grown to a set of thirteen volumes by the end of the war. Some of these volumes are already out of print. Now the series has been taken over by Pustet (Salzburg, Vienna) and Kenle (Heidelberg, Munich). The plan of publication calls for one reprint and one new volume a year.

The Society of St. Paul, under the leadership of its superior in Tokyo, the Reverend Paul Marcellino, is erecting a major broadcasting station in Tokyo, with plans for a ten-station subsidiary network. The purpose of the society in this new and progressive move is the diffusion of the Christian philosophy of life, with a particular stress on social, political, and economic problems. This is not directly a religious venture, but an educational one, in accord with the laws as established. The Japanese, but recently freed from imperialistic moulds, can easily fall before strong materialist pressures, unless the vacuum is filled by sound philosophical, economic, and political theory. At present, ignorance of the Western contributions in these fields is profound and widespread.

BOOK REVIEWS

DE PRINCIPIIS NATURAE. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Introduction and Critical Text by John J. Pauson. (Textus Friburgenses, 2). Fribourg: Société Philosophique; Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1950. Pp. 112. Fr. suisses 6.

This is an excellent critical edition of this important opusculum. It represents the work done as a dissertation for a doctorate by a young American scholar at the University of Fribourg. The director was Father Paul Wyser, O.P., now well known for his textual work on the Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate. The simplest thing that can be said about Dr. Pauson's edition is that, unlike several other recent editions of St. Thomas, it will not need to be done over again.

In determining his reading of the De Principiis Naturae, Pauson made a preliminary study of more than sixty manuscripts and incunabula. These are described in his Introduction, pp. 20-50. They are reduced to six groups. No autograph is known to be extant; but the lead manuscript in one group, MS 1158 of Metz municipal library, seems to be but one step removed from the autograph. A well arranged stemma (p. 60) justifies the selection of six key manuscripts as the basis for the critical text. It is not possible to check the paleographic work, but the extensive critical apparatus indicates thoroughness and accuracy.

The resultant text is in many places different from that of the previous editions in print. Thus, where Mandonnet (p. 8, l. 16) has "(subjectum enim dat esse accidenti, scilicet existendi, quia accidens non habet esse nisi per subjectum): unde dicitur quod accidentia sunt in subjecto, non autem dicitur quod forma substantialis sit in subjecto," the Pauson text omits the bracketed words, which do not appear in any of the six basic manuscripts. What we have here seems to be the interpolation of a marginal gloss into later copies of the text. Pauson's text reads well throughout and makes sense in passages which were previously obscure or even untranslatable.

Besides explaining and justifying his use of the manuscripts (in a manner which makes the Introduction a useful tool for teaching textual criticism to English-speaking students) the editor has done several other good things in his prolegomena. He shows why there can be no doubt as to the authenticity of the opusculum. Its title is given as De principiis rerum naturalium in some manuscripts, but the address, ad fratrem Silvestrum, rests only on Ptolemy of Lucca's catalogue. No one has been able to identify Brother Sylvester. Pauson dates the work earlier than most people, putting it in the early part of the period 1252-54. The chief reason is that the Aristotle citations show that St. Thomas was using translations from the Arabic rather than from the Greek. Even the first book of the Commentaria in Libros Sententiarum contains quotations from the Graeco-Latin versions of Aristotle, indicating the chronological priority of this opusculum.

St. Thomas's thought in De principiis naturae parallels the doctrine of De ente et essentia. Even in discussing the principles of being and change in natural things, that is, in the realm of phusis, he is very metaphysical. His start is taken from what is meant by esse, substantia, potency and act, the four causes, and analogy. Dr. Pauson finds here the strong influence of Avicenna, previously demonstrated by Roland-Gosselin in his studies on De ente et essentia.

This text is well annotated and indexed. References to Aristotle, Avicenna, and Averroes are made by means of quotations from thirteenth-century manuscripts of Latin versions that are very close to the texts read by St. Thomas. The Bibliography is accurate and quite adequate. Dr. Pauson's work should gain acceptance as the standard edition of the opusculum.

VERNON J. BOURKE

Saint Louis University

MODERN EDUCATION AND HUMAN VALUES. "Pitcairn-Crabbe Foundation Lecture Series," Vol. I. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1947. Pp. xi + 165. $3.00.

This volume contains six lectures discussing "the major social and moral issues which confront education today." They were originally delivered under the auspices of the School of Education

of the University of Pittsburgh during 1946-47, by six speakers "of differing educational experience and of varying points of view."

In the first lecture, Boyd H. Bode, professor emeritus at Ohio State University, denounces the teaching of the Christian religion and the great classics in our schools as subversive of American democracy. The true prophet of democracy is regarded as John Dewey. In the second lecture, Douglas Southall Freeman, editor of the Richmond News Leader, discusses "Human Values in the Social Sciences." In the third, Chancellor Arthur H. Compton of Washington University talks about UNESCO as a program of world education for peace. In the fourth lecture, which is perhaps the most interesting of the six, Henry P. Van Dusen, president of the Union Theological Seminary, discusses the relationship of education and Christianity in a spirit very different from that of Professor Bode. According to Van Dusen,

> We stand at the close of an epoch of criticism and correction essentially negative in character, which began roughly with Descartes and has dominated the past three centuries. But we stand as children of that negative, one-sided, and dying impulse. There can be no sound advance save through those whose whole outlook has been radically and thoroughly remade; that is, those who have been soundly converted to authentic Christian faith.

In the fifth lecture, "Is the Educational System Obsolete?" Chancellor Robert Maynard Hutchins points out that the obsolescence of an institution depends not upon its failure to supply what the community wants, but what it needs. Our permanent need, rendered more acute by imminent atomic catastrophe, is liberal education appropriate to man, and this is to be found in the "Great Books." How it is to be found in them, under what conditions, and under whose direction—these are questions Hutchins neglects to raise. To this reviewer, it has become painfully obvious that the currently popular "Great Books" seminars and the curricula at St. John's and Chicago are hopelessly inadequate and superficial attempts to answer this question. It is simply not true that the so-called "Great Books" teach themselves or that they are their own best teachers. Nor can whatever wisdom they have to offer be painlessly acquired in rudderless "seminars." Compared with the intellectual and spiritual wasteland which Professor Bode and the followers of Dewey regard as education for democracy, Chancellor

Hutchins might seem to be calling us to a kingdom of the mind shining with endless riches and delight. But he has failed to provide us with a road map of the country.

The book concludes with an address by Ordway Tead on "Education for Self and Society."

As a whole, the book is, to put it mildly, disappointing, although one would be foolish to approach this type of book with great expectations.

LEONARD J. ESLICK

Saint Louis University

HUMANISM AS A PHILOSOPHY. By Corliss Lamont. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. 368. $3.75.

In this excellently organized presentation of the humanist position in philosophy, Dr. Corliss Lamont has attained a clarity and simplicity of expression rarely encountered, but fervently longed for, in philosophical writing. It is unfortunate, however, that the merit of his position is incongruous with the lucidity of his "clear and distinct ideas." In fact, it turns out that the clarity is really specious after all—specious, because, when the analysis is pushed beyond a facile humanist description, the very foundations of humanism become shaky and untenable.

The thesis of the book appears in eight propositions that constitute the humanist's creed. The first proposition repudiates any conception of the universe that entails the existence of God. Stated negatively, the humanist's theory of reality ". . . rules out as superfluous the hypothesis of a supernatural God as Creator or First Cause of the universe" (p. 159); and, affirmatively, the humanist accepts "a naturalistic cosmology or metaphysics or attitude toward the universe . . ." (p. 19). The second article in the humanist's creed is the denial of personal immortality. Chapter III is entitled "This Life Is All and Enough"; and man ". . . is an inseparable unity of body and personality having no individual survival beyond death" (p. 20). All the labor and the magnificent reasoning of Immanuel Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason has been for nought. "The highest aim," says Kant, "to which the speculation of reason in its transcendental employment is directed comprehends three objects: the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God"; cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. M.

Muller [2d. ed.] p. 640). Philosophy bakes no bread, to be sure; but we have been deceived, vaingloriously deluded, by the notion that it will give us God and immortality. Perhaps Descartes's evil genius has been at work!

In article three it is maintained that thinking is as natural as breathing. Obviously thinking is not nonnatural or unnatural. What the humanist fails to recognize, however, is that the central question is not the bifurcation of natural from nonnatural, but an explanation of the natural. Moreover, here the arguments of the humanist against all philosophical dualisms (mind vs. matter, good vs. evil, ideas vs. sensations, and so on) operate in reverse against him, for his is the most decisive and far-reaching dualism of all—the natural in opposition to the supernatural. The humanist protests that he does not know what the supernatural connotes, that at best it refers to something meaningless, superfluous, mystical; nevertheless, he knows what the "natural" refers to, and also what does and what does not belong there. What is it, then, that does not exist and that he can recognize as not affiliated with naturalism? Nothingness! Bergson had something significant to say about nothingness. ". . . there is more, and not less, in the idea of an object conceived as 'existing' . . . Negation, therefore, differs from affirmation properly so called in that it is an affirmation of the second degree" (H. Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Mitchell [New York: Henry Holt & Co.], pp. 286, 288). No; the humanist does not render unto God the things that belong to God; everything is rendered unto Caesar. It is not, withal, a naturalistic monism, for the diremption between natural and supernatural has been rigidly fixed. If there is anything monistic about humanism, it is that one of the dual realms is adhered to with unwavering loyalty.

Articles four through eight are, in general, acceptable to theists who do not view reality on the pattern of a huge disjunction, that is, either God or humanity. Therefore, the pursuit of reason and scientific method (article four), of freedom (article five), of ethics and human values (article six), of art and aesthetic experience (article seven), and of a wide ranging social program (article eight) —the pursuit of these desiderata is integrally affiliated with a religious view of reality and not exclusive to humanists. In fact, a religious conception of the universe clarifies the meaning at the core of reality, that which is the very raison d'être of ethical and social values. The humanists estimate the importance of ethics correctly, but they purchase "the good" too cheaply. Why seek the good? Because it is good! Because it is reasonable to do so! Why

be reasonable? Because it makes sense in a senseless world! The humanists are on the right track, but they stop disastrously short of the goal—short of the objective that makes our ethical journey intelligible: for ethics is an important avenue to God. As Kant noted, "If you do not take care that you first make men at least moderately good, you will never make them honest believers" (op. cit., p. 667, footnote).

Our primary concern is with the distinctively humanist position that God does not exist and immortality is an illusion. This conception, or lack of conception, is argued for in interesting fashion and an abundance of evidence is collected. Nevertheless, with due regard for the research involved, the conclusions rest upon certain assumptions by means of which they are stamped quod erat demonstrandum. In the first place, there is the singular usage applied to the principle of parsimony, the doctrine that principles are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. Unless this is interpreted to mean that a naturalistic "explanation" is really an "explanation" and not merely a description, and that it is more adequate than a nonnaturalistic explanation, then Occam's Razor can add no force to the naturalist's argument. Moreover, this appealing postulate does not refer to principles easiest to understand or least difficult to expound. An explanatory principle must do precisely what we expect such a principle to do—explain. Hence it is not the principle of parsimony but our philosophical views that lead to the establishment of criteria for adequate explanation. At most the application of the principle of parsimony serves only to illustrate how we define valid explanation.

The humanist investigates the evidence as if in the inspection per se he will discover data that will reveal two things: (1) the meaning of explanation, and (2) a specific explanation. He makes a great deal of 2: "I have the evidence"; "look at the facts." (Francis Bacon's dictum, "Let the facts speak for themselves," echoes the same notion, a magnificent idea—that is, once agreement has been attained regarding which facts, and assuming that some miraculous means can be tapped to make them vocal!) Then he summarily proceeds to forget that his precise meaning of "evidence" and "facts" is adduced from his own restricted frame of reference. His "facts" determine what he means by a fact, and what he means by a fact denotes what he calls "facts." He is like the magician who has placed a rabbit in a hat and then, feigning surprise and satisfaction—he finds it there! Perhaps there is some truth in the platitude "Figures don't lie; but liars figure." Though crude, it serves to

caution us that facts have significance only in relation to a realm of meaning, a system of interpretation.

The humanist has a great deal of faith in the old esse est percipi principle of Berkeley, albeit without the theological conclusions of subjective idealism. If perceiving does not create being, then it is, at least, the proof of being. Associated with this is the cognate argument that empirical evidence is the only kind of evidence. Seeing is believing. (We are all familiar with the spurious reasoning of otherwise sensible individuals that the soul does not exist, because in their dissections they never saw one!) In essence, what the humanist is saying is (a) that what is not empirically demonstrable is not capable of proof; and (b) that if it is not empirically demonstrable, then it is nonexistent. All that the humanist is entitled to affirm, however, is a, and only when a is limited to the humanist's criteria of proof. When he says, therefore, "This world is all and enough," what he means to say is, "This world is all that my particular system of evidence permits me to know." Similarly, to affirm that God is unnecessary and that immortality is an illusion is to say something definite about a transempirical realm, something beyond the ken of the humanist's circumscribed frame of reference. It is hardly in keeping with the picture he has painted—that his is the conception of the universe that rests upon reason, science, and humility toward knowledge claims! Whitehead's observation regarding Kant might be meaningfully amended, for if egoism ever ran rampant it is in "the egoism of the humanist outlook."

WILLIAM S. KRAEMER

University of Arkansas

THE ILLUSION OF IMMORTALITY. By Corliss Lamont. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. 316. $3.95.

This book is the second edition of a work that appeared in 1935. Professor Lamont writes interestingly, and will, unfortunately, whet the interest of those who accept his erroneous assumptions without question. His method is to amass data and attempt to gain the credibility of the reader by the sheer quantity of information collected.

The intrinsic weakness of this enterprise is the naturalistic-humanistic attempt to prove both too little and too much. For example, in his analysis of the mind-body problem Lamont is signifi-

cantly impressed by the intricate physical correlations that result in the functional harmony of the human organism. Nevertheless, like all humanistic naturalists, he does not push his logic far enough and fails to give us an explanation for the complexity and functional harmony. It merely is! On the other hand, he proves too much about our magnificently intricate physical being when he argues, fallaciously, that the physical harmony per se provides ample evidence that the nonmaterial soul is an illusion.

The philosophical limitations of Lamont's Humanism As a Philosophy (reviewed above) are equally applicable to this book.

WILLIAM S. KRAEMER

University of Arkansas

A HISTORY OF ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY. By Frederick Mayer. New York: American Book Co., 1950. Pp. vi + 546.

In reading this history of ancient and medieval philosophy, one is aware of the stress given to what the author refers to as a "dynamic" approach to the study of philosophy. This "dynamic" approach is intended to show the relation between social environment and philosophical ideas; to show how philosophical ideas have grown against a background of economic, political, and cultural factors; and, finally, by comparing ancient and medieval thought with modern and contemporary thought, to arrive at a truer appreciation of present-day problems.

The relation of philosophy to outside social factors is workable and understandable in any history of philosophy, but not to the extent that philosophical knowledge should be sacrificed. Though it is evident that this book is written with sincerity and good will, one must nevertheless question the somewhat cursory and rapid philosophical analysis. Throughout the book, there is no indication of intensive scholarship, of research, or of penetrating insights into the philosophical ideas that the ancient and medieval philosophers were confronted with. Sources referred to are oftentimes superficial; in some places an English translation, which scholars would choose to avoid, is the basis for the material written on the philosophers.

Since it would be impossible to raise all the doctrinal objections that one might find in this book, a few examples will suffice to show the questionable status of the author's understanding of certain

theological and philosophical principles. For example, in speaking of the relation of the Ten Commandments to morality, the author's contention is that the Ten Commandments hindered civilization by identifying morality with divine commandments; and this, he continues, is a most serious weakness, for moral laws are constantly changing, not eternal (p. 287). The immediate objection to such a statement is that if moral laws are always changing, the science of ethics has no foundation. Furthermore, the position of morality and theology can never be a completely unrelated one, since all the sciences are ordered by wisdom, and it is the function of divine wisdom to order and govern the lower sciences.

Another instance of theological and moral confusion may be quoted.

> The moral system of the Old Testament gave powerful support to the priestly class, which developed numerous taboos associated with the religious ritual and saw to it that the laws were followed strictly. This moral system led to two types of standards: one for the chosen group and one for outsiders. This dualism has continued through civilization and constitutes the real ethical foundation of modern nationalism (p. 288).

Moreover, "the greatness of the prophets has been exaggerated" (p. 288). It is apparent that the author would prefer to free morality from Scripture and from God, and make morality an exclusively human science, as if human nature and human activity could ever be exclusive of God!

The author's misconception of certain Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysical principles is quite surprising. The weak analysis of Aristotle's doctrine of substance is caused by the author's neglect of the basic texts from the Physics and Metaphysics, where Aristotle identifies substance with being. The author, as a result, misunderstands Aristotle's doctrine of matter and form, and identifies matter with substance.

> Matter . . . gives the substance to things; form, their outline and boundary. Every object, then, has a matter and a form. But this is not a static relationship, for we constantly observe how matter passes into form and form into matter. We might take a concrete example. Take the seed of an orange. It is the matter of which the orange is the form. When we eat the orange, however,

> the orange becomes matter for our body, which in turn becomes a form (p. 155).

Such an interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine is incorrect, to say the least. Had the author understood Aristotle's doctrine of change (this he mentions only casually), which is the center of Aristotelian philosophy, he would have seen that there is in reality and in change a principle of change and potency. This principle is matter which is determinable and capable of becoming something. In change there is also a principle of permanence and act. This principal is form which is the determining and specifying principle of reality. Further, in change, it is substances that change, and these substances are composed of matter and form. This was Aristotle's chief objection against the ancient atomists who said that all substances are the same and that change is located in the differences.

This misunderstanding of Aristotelian principles leads to a confusion about the Thomistic doctrine of creation. We read, for example: "As the cause of all being . . . God created the world, which was made out of nothing. In other words, all species were produced at once, a conclusion which Darwin attacked in his theory of evolution" (p. 457). One might say that God's creative act is one act, but God did not create or make things to be and remain one in species. This is evident from the fact of substantial change in the universe, and it is because there is substantial change that the philosopher can argue against a rigid fixity of species. Evolution is not philosophically impossible; but an evolution without finality (as Darwin's) is impossible.

On the whole, the research and philosophical analysis are questionable, and this book will most likely be viewed with suspicion by historians in the field of ancient and medieval philosophy.

LOTTIE H. KENDZIERSKI

Marquette University

WORLDS IN COLLISION. By Immanuel Velikovsky. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1950 [originally New York: Macmillan Co., 1950]. Pp. xiv + 401. $4.50.

This book is presented as an example of "historical cosmogony" and tells what Dr. Velikovsky says happened to the earth during the period stretching from 1500 B.C. to 687 B.C. as a result of

quasicontacts with other planets. It is based upon the assumption that the planet Venus, which is said to have originated as a comet out of the planet Jupiter, pursued an entirely erratic course during the above-mentioned period. The consequences for the earth were catastrophic and globe-encompassing. In particular, the author tells us: "Between 747 and 687 the calendar was in a chaotic state, the length of the year and of the month, and probably also of the day, repeatedly changing." What we call the stately order of the heavens is merely a recent and casual state of a solar system which behaves in a manner similar to the atom of early quantum theory.

As a matter of fact, there is no historical evidence for the chaotic behavior of the planets during the period mentioned by Dr. Velikovsky. In an excellent review of Worlds in Collision, by the eminent authority on Babylonian science, Dr. O. Neugebauer, who kindly allowed me to see it some months ago, it is noted that we possess excellent documentary evidence for the perfect regularity of celestial motion just before the "catastrophe" of 747 B.C., right after it, and a few years before the upheaval of 687 B.C. postulated by Dr.Velikovsky. Dr. Neugebauer shows, texts in hand, that the historically recorded solar and lunar eclipses which are ascribed to the period indicated are in perfect agreement with astronomical computation, which would be impossible if events had taken place in the manner described by Dr. Velikovsky. Similarly, the evidence for the regularity of the motion of Venus at the earlier time (1500 B.C.) is attested by the Babylonian records which have been examined most thoroughly by Langdon and Fotheringham. Thus, Dr. Velikovsky's historical theory, which is based on the pure assumption that such and such events took place in historical times, falls because of the positive evidence to the contrary.

There is really little more to say about the matter at this late date after publication (the book was published last April). One matter bears mentioning. The Macmillan Company returned all rights in the book to its author last June. The book is now published by Doubleday. It has been said that the Macmillan Company was induced to drop the book under the threat of boycott made by a group of scientists who, it has been alleged, acted under the leadership of an irate elder astronomer. If this is true, then some scientists acted unwisely. Truth is guaranteed by the evidence, not by the opinion of even a very large body of scientists. And, in passing, it may be noted that quite recently, the physicist F. Prunier, having submitted the various elements of the planets of the solar system to detailed examination, has found that the characteristic elements

of planetary motion verify quantum rules. (See Archives de Genève, July-August, 1946). Prunier's theory of a planetary atom has been criticized by J. Villey (Revue Générale des Sciences, 1948, p. 127). Dr. Velikovsky's planetary atom may have offended some of our scientists, but these men should have done more than merely denounce Dr. Velikovsky. After all, the idea which he has dramatized with such a copious and misguided use of literary sources is, it appears, a legitimate part of the actual state of the question in matters planetary. One must be just towards Dr. Velikovsky, though he is not to be excused on a large number of counts. Why, in particular, does he, on page 137, attribute to Aristotle a text which supports a point in his theory without mentioning that the text in question is regarded by competent Aristotelian scholars as spurious?

BRIAN COFFEY

Saint Louis University

THE INDIVIDUAL, THE STATE, AND WORLD GOVERNMENT. By A. C. Ewing. New York: Macmillan Co., 1947. Pp. viii + 322.

The general principles which Professor Ewing of the University of Cambridge offers by way of help in the solution of the great problems connected with the individual and his rights, the state, and world government, are described by him as a "universalistic utilitarianism." It is "universalistic" because the following of its principles will not always lead to the good of those who practice them but will lead to the "general good"; it is "utilitarian" because the obligations which it recognizes are general but not universal and absolute. In Professor Ewing's view, the general good is evidently opposed in some way to the private good of individuals; however, its primacy is asserted, as we have just seen, by the title "universalistic utilitarianism." But because Professor Ewing sees the general good as in itself a good which is alien to that of the individual, he adds to his recipe a leaven by which the totalitarian lump is lightened and democracy safeguarded: the obligations of this universalistic utilitarianism, though general, are not universal and absolute. In fact, after setting forth the distinction between a universalistic utilitarianism and an egoistic one, Professor Ewing is at pains through the rest of the book to assert that the value of individual freedom is much greater than that of some general good;

and this he does not only because he (rightly) insists that "man ought to be treated as an end . . . and not as a mere means," but because he thinks that the primacy of common good involves treating man as a mere means. His confusion becomes evident when we recall that he has already laid it down in the definition of his universalistic utilitarianism that the following of its principles will not always lead to the good of those who practice them, but will lead to the general good. Thus the author moves in circles around the problems of the individual and his rights, of the state, and of international government.

Like so many others, the author is earnestly looking for a non-totalitarian ethic. He rejects "the view that according to the constitution of their nature or the will of God all individuals have certain definite rights which it is always wrong to violate"; and he adopts the view which we have noticed and which calls natural rights not ever absolute but "prima facie" inasmuch as they hold up until the occasion arises for them to be yielded to the general good. Professor Ewing could have been helped in much of his labor by St. Thomas's distinctions between first and second principles of natural law and between a natural commensuration of thing and person which is absolute and one that is, though natural, only relative; so could he have been helped by St. Thomas's teaching on common good and on the whole of practical knowledge. It is a great pity that so many apparently earnest minds seem so innocently unaware of the things that would help them. In reading Professor Ewing's book one wonders less, however, about such innocence than he does about the guile which sees so much more.

CHARLES N. R. McCOY

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN THE UNITED STATES

For the purpose of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.
2. Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.
3. Books received by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.

AMERY, L. S. Thought and Language. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 19. $1.00.

AUGUSTINE, ST. Saint Augustine's De Fide Rerum Quae Non Videntur. A Critical Text and Translation with Introduction and Commentary. A Dissertation by Sister Mary Francis McDonald. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1950. Pp. 163. Paper, $1.75.

BENNETT, WALLACE F. Faith and Freedom. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1950. Pp. 160. $2.50.

BEYENKA, SISTER MARY MELCHIOR. Consolation in Saint Augustine. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1950. Pp. 138. Paper, $1.50.

BIRKHOFF, GARRETT. Hydrodynamics. A Study in Logic, Fact, and Similitude. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 199. $3.50.

BITTLE, CELESTINE N., O.F.M. Cap. The Science of Correct Thinking. Revised ed. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1950. Pp. 419. $2.50.

Because Father Bittle's textbook of logic is so well known, it will suffice to point out the revisions. The preface tells us that no substantial alterations have been made in the text as a whole. The chapter on logical opposition has ben largely rewritten, and diagrams added. The chapter on fallacies has been partly recast and enlarged. Exercises have been appended to most of the chapters.

BLACK, MAX, (ed.). Philosophical Analysis. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. vii + 429. $5.00.

To people who are puzzled by what seem to be verbal antics practised by philosophical analysts or are dismayed by the wide divergencies in this kind of writing, Professor Black's book will be of great help. In his discerning introduction, he shows that "philosophical analysis" is a name

for a family of philosophies rather than a single type; his comments on each type are sympathetic but not uncritical. Secondly, the collection of essays that exemplify various types of analysis are written by some of the most prominent analysts. They touch upon some of the hotly discussed problems of analysis and seem in general to be intended to be understood. Thirdly, Professor Black offers a selected bibliography of books and articles about analysis. For these reasons, this book deserves a high recommendation.

BOAS, GEORGE. Wingless Pegasus. A Handbook of Art Criticism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press; Sept., 1950. $3.50.

BOKSER, BEN ZION. The Legacy of Maimonides. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. ix + 128. $3.75.

This is a brief synthesis of the views of Maimonides. After a brief biography, Rabbi Bokser centers his exposition of the thought of Maimonides around the following points: reason and the quest for truth, our knowledge of God, the nature of religion, and man and the universe. The author considers the analysis and refutation of naturalism as perhaps the most significant thought of Maimonides; he does not seem to make a sharp distinction between the philosophic naturalism of Averroes and the scientific naturalism of today.

On the whole, this summary is accurate and sympathetic. In using the term "creation" the author implies that it always means "creation in time." This usage causes some difficulty; but if this meaning is kept in mind, there need be no misunderstanding.

There is an index.

BOYD, WILLIAM C. Genetics and the Races of Man. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.; Oct., 1950. $6.00.

BRINTON, CLARENCE CRANE. Ideas and Men. The Story of Western Thought. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950. Pp. 596. $6.00.

BROWNELL, BAKER. The Human Community. New York: Harper & Bros., 1950. Pp. 311. $4.00.

BRUBACHER, JOHN S. Modern Philosophies of Education. 2d. ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1950. Pp. ix + 349. $4.00.

Professor Brubacher's survey of present-day educational philosophy has been a widely used text since it was published in 1939. The present edition is a thorough revision. Three new chapters have been added on the nature of human nature, professional ethics, and consensus among philosophies of education. Two chapters of the first edition have been dropped, the ones on philosophical aspects of educational psychology, and the individual, society, and education. Bibliographies have been brought up to date. Finally, the typography has been improved.

The author's notes and bibliographies show that he knows the significant books and articles in each field and each philosophy that he is summarizing. Moreover, he has an unusual willingness and breadth of mind in entering into widely differing viewpoints. [To be reviewed]

BURCH, GEORGE BOSWORTH. Early Medieval Philosophy. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Dec., 1950. Pp. viii + 120. $2.25.

BURKE, KENNETH. The Philosophy of Literary Form. Reissue. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press. $3.00.

BURKE, MARJORIE L. Origin of History as Metaphysic. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. 61. $2.75.

This book seems to say that Christian dogma, itself dependent upon

the Platonic doctrine of the "image," created history as a science and a philosophy and dissolved and depersonalized knowledge in a universal becoming. The author holds for a kind of Kantianism as a corrective for all these errors.

There is nothing about the book to justify the price asked.

BUSWELL, J. OLIVER, Jr. The Philosophies of F. R. Tennant and John Dewey. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. $6.00

COHEN, BERNARD LANE. The Case for Conservatism. New York: Exposition Press, 1950. Pp. 143. $3.00.

This is a defense of, and a call for faith in, the traditional Western system of production and exchange. The defense is based on economics —not as economics presently exists, with its quarrels and pedantic distinctions, but as a common sense science of production and exchange, based on the author's concept of the "cell." The author contends that all units of production (family, factory, union, and so forth) are undifferentiated units. As a kind of basis for this theory, the author proposes a kind of materialistic naturalism.

CORBETT, SISTER THOMAS ALBERT. People or Masses. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1950. Pp. 254. Paper, $2.75.

CORNFORD, FRANCIS MACDONALD. Greek Religious Thought: from Homer to the Age of Alexander. Boston: Beacon Press; Nov., 1950.

D'ABRO, A. The Evolution of Scientific Thought, from Newton to Einstein. 2d. ed. New York: Dover Pubns., 1950. Pp. 481. $3.95.

Defensor Pacis of Marsilius of Padua, The. Translated by Alan Gewirth. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951.

DEWEY, JOHN. Reconstruction in Philosophy. New York: New American Lib.; Sept., 1950.

Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri, The. Translated by Jefferson B. Fletcher. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951.

DUNN, WILLIAM P. Sir Thomas Browne, A Study in Religious Philosophy. Revised ed. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1950. $3.00.

EWING, A. C. A Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Oct., 1950. $3.00.

FERM, VERGILIUS. A History of Philosophical Systems. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. xiv + 642. $6.00.

This book is composed of forty-seven articles by forty-one different authors, "each writing on his specialty." The major figures and systems in the history of philosophy are treated; ancient and medieval are covered in seventeen essays; the modern and contemporary movements are covered in the remaining thirty, obviously in greater detail. Each chapter has a short bibliography for further reading. There is an index.

The different chapters of this book are very unequal in value and accuracy; for an analysis and discussion of their merits and defects se the review to appear in a later issue of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN.

FINCH, JEREMIAH S. Sir Thomas Browne. A Doctor's Life of Science and Faith. New York: Henry Schuman; Oct., 1950. $3.50.

FLUBACHER, JOSEPH F. The Concept of Ethics in the History of Economics. New York: Vantage Press, 1950. Pp. 469. $5.00.

FONTAINE, REV. RAYMOND G. Subsistent Accident in the Philosophy of Saint Thomas and in His Predecessors. A Dissertation. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1950. Pp. 149. Paper, $1.75.

FOULQUIE, PAUL. Existentialism. New York: Roy Publs.; Sept, 1950. $2.50.

FRANZ, EDWARD QUINLISK. The Thomistic Doctrine on the Possible Intellect. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1950. Pp. 201. Paper, $2.00.

FRENCH, THOMAS, and OTHERS. Psychoanalysis and Ethics. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Round Table, 1950. Pp. 32. Paper, 10¢

FRIEDRICH, CARL J. The New Image of the Common Man. Boston: Beacon Press; Sept., 1950. $3.75.

GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, REGINALD, O.P. Reality. A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought. Translated by the Reverend Patrick Cummins, O.S.B. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1950. Pp. xiii + 419. $6.00.

This is a translation of La Synthèse Thomiste, which principally consisted of a translation of the article on Thomism that Father Garrigou-Lagrange wrote for the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, to which were added "occasional clarifications," and "a hundred pages on the objective bases of the Thomistic synthesis."

The article on Thomism is a dogmatic and synthetic presentation of the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas. The appended considerations treat of the "twenty-four theses," realism and first principles, realism and pragmatism, the nature of ontological personality (in which the postion of Cajetan is said to be that of St. Thomas), and efficacious grace (which is an attack on Molinism and a defence of the physical predetermination asserted by Bañez. [To be reviewed]

GEWIRTH, ALAN. Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political Philosophy. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951.

Great Books of the Western World. To be published by Encyclopaedia Britannica in collaboration with the University of Chicago.

GRENE, DAVID. Man in His Pride. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Oct., 1950. $4.00.

HAECKER, THEODOR. Kierkegaard the Cripple. Translated from the German by C. Van O. Bruyn. Introduction by A. Dru. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. 64. $2.75.

HALLOWELL, JOHN H. Main Currents in Modern Political Thought. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1950. Pp. 771. $6.75.

HASKINS, CARYL P. Of Societies and Men. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.; Jan., 1951. $3.75.

HILBERT, D., and ACKERMANN, W. Principles of Mathematical Logic. New York: Chelsea Pub. Co., 1950. Pp. xii + 172. $3.50.

The Idea and Practice of General Education: An Account of the College of the University of Chicago. By Present and Former Members of the Faculty. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Oct., 1950. $3.50.

Index Translationum, or International Bibliography of Translations. Published under the Auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 415. $3.00.

ISAACS, NATHAN. The Foundations of Common Sense. New York: Roy Publs.; Sept., 1950. $3.50.

JAMES, WILLIAM. The Principles of Psychology. New York: Dover Pubns., 1950. Pp. 1408. $7.50.

JOAD, C. E. M. A Critique of Logical Positivism. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Oct., 1950. $2.75.

JOHNSON, A. H.; HARTSHORNE, CHARLES; and LOWE, VICTOR. Whitehead and the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press; Nov., 1950. $1.75.

KATZ, JOSEPH. Plotinus' Search for the Good. New York: Columbia Univ. Press;

Dec., 1950. Pp. viii + 120. $2.50.

KEENAN, JOSEPH B., and BROWN, BRENDAN F. Crimes against International Law. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1950. $3.25.

KEYNES, JOHN MAYNARD. A Treatise on Probability. New York: Macmillan Co., 1950. Pp. 466. $3.75.

KORZYBSKI, ALFRED. Manhood of Humanity. 2d. ed. Lakeville, Conn.: Institute of General Semantics, 1950. Pp. 391. $4.50.

KRESGE, E. E. The Search for a Way of Life. New York: Exposition Press, 1950. Pp. xiv + 434. $4.00.

This book is a survey of classical and modern systems of ethical thought. Ethical systems are said to be of four types: intuitionist-idealist, hedonist, humanistic, and social-legal. Each of these major divisions is subdivided in various ways. The author insists on the importance and the distinct function of ethics especially in modern times. His purpose in this survey would seem to be to point out the good aspects of the better variety of each system, and then to let the student or reader take his choice.

The author's evident good will, sincerity, and wide experience as teacher and counselor do not reach the results that might be expected. The systems that he considers are not divided on a single basis (that is, according to their foundations, or their standard of morality), but according to several bases at once. It seems, moreover, that the main heads are too few to make a clear presentation possible. Finally, there are several rather strangely confused notions--that monastic orders are essentially escapist (pp. 19-20); that neo-Thomism was imposed to settle the disputes between Dominicans and Franciscans (p. 228, n. 29); that a large share of the blame for the present world crisis must fall upon America (not so much for mistakes and compromises, which could well enough be conceded) because of its imperialism (pp. 393-409).

LASLETT, PETER. The Physical Basis of Mind. New York: Macmillan Co., 1950. Pp. 87. $1.00.

LAUTERPACHT, HERSH. International Law and Human Rights. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1950. Pp. 491. $8.50.

LEAKE, CHAUNCEY D., and ROMANELL, PATRICK. Can We Agree? A Scientist and a Philosopher Argue about Ethics. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1950. Pp. xiii + 110. Paper, apply.

The principals in this discussion are prominent in their respective fields. Dr. Leake, at one time vice-president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, in his retiring address proposed that the scientific method be used in ethics for the sake of progress and of reaching agreement; he disposed of the philosophical ethicians by referring to their work as an "irrelevance" and a "semantic confusion." Dr. Romanell, formerly a pupil of W. P. Montague, replied in an article in which he shows that the scientific method is more than description, that scientism is an unwarranted narrowness of view, that relativism and Darwinism, in destroying the normative character of ethics, destroy ethics altogether. Dr. Leake concedes in a rebuttal that the philosophers may have something to offer in the line of synthesis and hypothesis. Dr. Romanell then pleads for the value (if not the truth) of the metaphysical approach. Dr. Leake's papers constitute a straightforward presentation of one type of logical positivism. Dr. Romanell's criticism is very good; his own point of view is that of Montague with some improvements.

Each of the authors presents a paper in an appendix. Dr. Romanell pleads for a naturalistic logic and metaphysics, where "naturalism" seems to refer on the one hand to a philosophy of "real essences" and on the other hand to antisupernaturalism. Dr. Leake offers a fervid and bombastic paper on science and freedom.

Library of Living Philosophers, The. Now distributed, and henceforth will be published by the Tudor Pub. Co., New York.

LUCE, CLARE BOOTH, and ADLER, MORTIMER J. The Great Ideas. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Round Table, 1950. Pp. 17. Paper, 10¢

MANNHEIM, KARL. Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Sept., 1950. $5.00.

MARSHALL, THOMAS HUMPHREY. Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 154. $2.50.

MARTINI EPISCOPI BRACARENSIS. Opera Omnia. Edited by Claude W. Barlow. Published for the American Academy in Rome. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. xii + 328. $3.50.

This is an excellent critical edition of the works of St. Martin of Braga. Of interest to philosophers is the Formula vitae honestae, an essay on the moral virtues that is closely modeled on the doctrine and writings of Seneca. The Formula served as the basis for a small tract, frequently called De quattuor virtutibus cardinalibus, which in the late Middle Ages was attributed to Seneca. Thus we have another evidence for the great influence of Seneca in the field of medieval moral philosophy.

MASON, ROBERT EMMETT. Moral Values and Secular Education. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. X + 158. $2.75.

McELROY, HOWARD C. Modern Philosophers. New York: Russell F. Moore Co., 1950. Pp. 300. $4.00.

McQUADE, FRANCIS P. A Philosophical Interpretation of the Contemporary Crisis of Western Civilization. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1950. Pp. 145. Paper, $1.50.

MILLER, PERRY. The Transcendentalists. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. xviii + 521. $5.00.

MOORE, BARRINGTON, Jr. Soviet Politics—The Dilemma of Power. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 521. $6.00; text. ed., $4.50.

MORGAN, WILLIAM S. The Philosophy of Religion. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1950. Pp. xv + 413. $6.00.

According to the author, philosophy is "a tendency to refer all experience and its implied realities to a fundamental and all embracing principle" (p. 17) and religion is "the realization that we are essential and contributory participants in ultimate reality" (p. 19). The author seems to maintain a modified Spinozism—reality is an infinite Self-activity (pp. 130, 224-30). He asserts that knowledge, science, art, and causality are completely subjective (see pp. 145, 207, 321, 386).

In keeping with the tortuous processes by which this is expounded, the style is frequently awkward and sometimes oddly imaginative.

MORRIS, LLOYD R. William James. The Message of a Modern Mind. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1950. Pp. 107. $2.00.

MURRAY, GILBERT. Stoic, Christian and Humanist. Boston: Beacon Press; Sept., 1950. $2.00.

NEF, JOSEPH U. War and Human Progress. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1950. $6.00.

OAKELEY, HILDA DIANA. Greek Ethical Thought: from Homer to the Stoics.

Boston: Beacon Press; Nov., 1950.

OUSPENSKY, P. D. The Psychology of Man's Possible Evolution. New York: Hedgehog Press, 1950. Pp. 98. $2.50.

PERSONS, STOW. Evolutionary Thought in America. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; Nov., 1950. $5.00.

PIAGET, JEAN. The Psychology of Intelligence. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.; Nov., 1950. $3.50.

POUND, ROSCOE. New Paths of the Law. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1950. $2.00.

PRICHARD, H. A. Knowledge and Perception. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1950. Pp. 223. $3.00.

RADER, MELVIN MILLER. Ethics and Society. An Appraisal of Social Ideals. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1950. Pp. 413. $4.50.

RAPAPORT, DAVID. The Organization and Pathology of Thought. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1951.

RIEZLER, KURT. Man: Mutable and Immutable. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; Dec., 1950. Pp. 384. $5.00.

RÖPKE, WILHELM. The Social Crisis of Our Time. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Sept., 1950. $3.50.

RYAN, JOHN JULIAN. Beyond Humanism. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1950. $3.50.

RYLE, GILBERT. The Concept of Mind. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1950. Pp. 334. $3.00.

First published in 1949 by Hutchinson's University Library (London), this book presents an unusually nuanced behaviorism. The author's own particular contribution is the use of semantics instead of denial (or even abuse) upon what he calls "official" dualism. Part of his argument, directed against a hypostatized consciousness and the dualism of the two-substance theory, is a sound and often witty criticism. But the positive argumentation—that because we can describe actions only in terms of their objects, actions and principles of action are therefore unnecessary—strikes the reader as an unaccountable failure of insight.

Within the defective over-all argument, there are some brilliant analyses. See, for example, his keen analysis of the alleged sufficiency of mechanism and physics to explain our experienced world (pp. 76-82); or his criticism of the theory that we sense sensible appearances that are special objects distinct from the things that appear (pp. 210-22).

SAUNDERS, J. J. The Age of Revolution. New York: Roy Publs., 1950. $3.50.

SIMPSON, GEORGE GAYLORD. Charles Darwin's Autobiography. With an Essay on the Meaning of Darwin. New York: Henry Schuman; Oct., 1950. $3.50.

SINGER, DOROTHY WALEY. Giordano Bruno: His Life and Thought. New York: Henry Schuman; Sept., 1950. $6.00.

SINNOTT, EDMUND W. Cell and Psyche: The Biology of Purpose. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press; Oct., 1950. Pp. 128. $2.00.

SMITH, ELWOOD F., O.P., and RYAN, LOUIS A., O.P. Preface to Happiness. "A Guidebook to the Summa," Vol. II. New York: Benziger Bros., 1950. Pp. xx + 281. $4.00.

The series "A Guidebook to the Summa" is intended to serve as an introduction, guide and review of St. Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. The present volume corresponds to the Prima Secundae.

The general idea of this series has been derived from the work of Father Walter Farrell, O.P., A Companion to the Summa. The present

authors follow a more mechanical method, dividing their treatment into problems, principles, development of principles, and exercises. Readings are also indicated, and there are a glossary and reference notes. One of the parts of the discussion of each article is labeled "theological reason"; if this is intended to translate ratio theologica, the term is flagrantly misused.

With the aid of a competent teacher, this book might help students of St. Thomas's theology. Otherwise it seems likely to foster memorization and verbal facility in dealing with theological and philosophical problems.

SOKOLOFF, BORIS. Science and the Purpose of Life. New York: Creative Age Press; Oct., 1950. $3.00.

SOROKIŃ, PITIRIM A. Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis: Danilevsky, Spengler, Toynbee, Northrop, Kroeber, Schweitzer, Berdyaev, and Others. Boston: Beacon Press; Oct., 1950. $4.00.

SPENCER, HERBERT. The Man Versus the State. Introduction by Professor A. E. Heath. Boston: Beacon Press; Sept., 1950. $1.75.

STALLKNECHT, NEWTON P., and BRUMBAUGH, ROBERT S. The Spirit of Western Philosophy. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950. Pp. 561. $4.75.

STEWART, H. F. Pascal's Pensées. New York: Pantheon Books, 1950. Pp. 543. $5.00.

TOYNBEE, ARNOLD J. War and Civilization. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Oct., 1950. $2.50.

TURNER, WILLIAM D. Psychology and the Soul. Philadelphia. Univ. of Pennsylvania Press; Nov., 1950. $3.50.

VIËTOR, KARL. Goethe the Thinker. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Nov., 1950. $4.00.

VIVAS, ELISEO. The Moral Life and the Ethical Life. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Oct., 1950. $6.00.

WAGGONER, HYATT HOWE. The Heel of Elohim. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press; Oct., 1950. $3.00.

WEITZ, MORRIS. Philosophy of the Arts. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Dec., 1950. $3.75.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH, and RUSSELL, BERTRAND. Principia Mathematica. Reissue. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. 3 vols. $30.00.

WIENER, NORBERT. The Human Use of Human Beings. Cybernetics and Society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950. Pp. 241. $3.00.

WILSON, THOMAS. Modern Capitalism and Economic Progress. New York: Macmillan Co., 1950. Pp. 280. $2.50.

ZIMMER, HEINRICH. The Philosophies of India. Edited by Joseph Campbell. New York: Pantheon Books; Nov., 1950. $4.50.

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